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DOUBLE HELIX, DOUBLE BIND: FACTUAL INNOCENCE AND
POSTCONVICI'ION DNA TESTING
SETH

F. KREIMERt & DAVID RUDOVSKYtt

INTRODUCTION: A TALE OF TwO CONVICTIONS

A. The Bruce Godscha/A Stury
In the summer of 1986, less than two months apart, two women
who lived in the same housing complex in Montgomery County,
Pennsylvania, were raped by an assailant who .entered their apartments at night. Based on the descriptions provided by the victims,
and the similar means of entry into the residences and other actions
of the assailant, it appeared highly probable that a single person was
responsible for both attacks. The police prepared a composite sketch
of the suspect. Several months later, based on a call from Bruce Godschalk's sister informing authorities that her brother looked like the
person in the sketch, the police showed a photo spread to the victims,
one of whom identified Godschalk. Soon thereafter, the police
brought Godschalk into the police district and interrogated him about
the incidents. According to the police, in noncustodial questioning,
and with no pressure or coercion, Godschalk readily admitted to the
2
crimes in a taped interview. Indeed, the police claimed that he pro-

Professor of Law, University or Pennsylvania Law SchooL
Senior Fellow, University of Pennsyh·,mia Law Sch()Qt.
We gratefully acknowledge the illuminating comments of our colleagues AI Alschuler, Susan Herman, Leo Katz, Stephen Morse, and Leonard Sosnov; the very helpful research assistance of Leonardo Cuello and Vanessa Richards; and the pathbreak·
ing work in DNA exoneration of the Innocence Project at Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law. Aid from these sources in the development of this Article in no way
makes them responsible for any errors of fact or law, which remain the responsibility of
the authors alone.
1
In the intere:'lt of full disclosure, it should be noted that the authors are part of
the team of counsel that represented Bruce Godschalk in this case and that currently
seeks to obtain damages for his wrongful incarceration. This team also includes Peter
Neufeld and Barry Scheck from the Innocence Project at Cardozo Law School.
1
Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366,
368-69 (E.D. Pa. 2001). The police questioned Godschalk for approximately two hours
before he gave a statement; only the formal "confession" was taped. !d. at 368.
t
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vided details of the assaults that only the victims, the police, and the
rapist knew, as the police had not disseminated this information to
·
the public.~
At trial, the prosecution presented the eyewitness testimony (a
complainant testified that she studied and compared the photographs
presented to her by the detective)/ the confession, evidence of the
similar modus operandi of the rapist, and a jailhouse informant who
testified that Godschalk admitted the crimes to him while in jail awaiting trial. 5
In addition, the prosecutor otfered scientific evidence: the semen
recovered from the first rape was from a man with type B blood, and
Godschalk had type B blood. Godschalk, who had recanted his "confession" pretrial, testified that the detectives tricked him into admitting the crimes and asserted that they provided him with the private
details of the assaults. Not surprisingly, with a full confession, modus
operandi evidence, eyewitness identification, and blood-type match~ ld.
4

In recent studies, the dangers of witnesses making false identifications as a result
ofphotospreads shown in groups have been well documented. Witnesses in such situations may select the person who most closely resembles the assailant, even if they can·
not independently identify that person. Furthermore, unless they are informed that
the investigation will continue even if they do not make an identification, many will
believe that the matter will be dropped if they do not identify a suspect. See NAT'L.
INST. OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A GUIDE FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT 19 (1999) (outlining basic procedures to obtain the most reliable and
accurate information from eyewitnesses), available m http:/ /www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/
nij/178240.pdf; Gary L. Wells et al., J:.)ewitness ldmtification Procedures: Recommnui.ations
for l..i.neups and Photospreads. 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 629 (1998) (detailing instruc·
tions that should be given to eyewitnesses when viewing lineups or photospreads). See
gmerally ELI:i'..ABETH F. LOFfUS & jAMES M. D0\'1.£, EYEWlTNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND
CRIMINAL § 4 (3d ed. 1997) (identifYing wa}'J to prevent. mist.1ken identification).
Some observers recommend that witnesses be informed that the investigation will con·
tinue regardless of their ability to identify, that the detective showing the photographs
not know the "prime suspect," and that the photographs be shown sequentially to
avoid the comparison process. Wells et al., supra, at 627.
~ The unreliability of jailhouse infonnants' testimony has been well documented.
~. e.g., REPORT OF THE H..LINOJS GOVERNOR'S COMMISSION ON CAPITAL PUNISHMENT
(Apr. 15, 2002) (containing recommendations for specific improvements to the capital
punishment system in Illinois), av.aiklble at http;/ /www.idoc,state.il.u8/ccp/ccp/
reports/commission_report/complete_report.pdf. Police use of jailhouse informants
is subject to some constitutional limitations, but informants' testimony is generally admissible and issues of credibility are left to the jury. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S.
436, 455 (1986) (holding that a prisoner who made statements to a jailhouse informant was not entitled to relief because there was overwhelming evidence of the prisoner's guilt and his constitutional claim did not "itself raise any question as to his guilt
or innocence"). But see United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 274 (1980) (holding that
a prisoner's statements to an informant should not have been admitted at trial).
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ings, the jury convicted Godschalk of both crimes. In 1987, he was
sentenced to a term often to twenty years' imprisonment.
In 1995, based on Pennsylvania cases establishing a qualified right
to postconviction access to previously untested DNA evidence,ti Godschalk filed a petition seeking access to the DNA evidence from both
7
incidents still held by the Disuict Attomey. The Superior Court of
Pennsylvania denied access on the grounds that the prosecution's case
was overwhelming and that it rested on more than contested eyewit8
ness identification.
Godschalk then filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
for access to the DNA evidence, claiming a constitutional right to access and testing as a matter of due process of law. The District Attorney opposed this action, arguing that it was procedurally barred by the
Rookn:-Feldman doctrine9 and that there was no constitutional right to
access to potentially exculpatory evidence postconviction. In support
of the defense to the civil litigation, the disuict attorney stressed the
strength of the State's case at u;al and, in particular, Godschalk's confession with its numerous details of facts known only to the complainants, police, and rapist. The disuict court ruled that the Rooker1

See Commonwealth v. Reese, 663 A.2d 206, 210 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (affirming
grant of prisoner's request for postconviction relief and DNA testing, and granting n
new trial on the basis of test results); Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425 (Pa.
Super. C:t. 1992) ("[P]rinciples of justice require us to \"dCate appellant's conviction
and remand to the trial court for the performance nf DNA analysis on the samples
taken from the victim.~).
·
7
In the firy;t rape, the police had seized semen samples from the carpet, and the
prosecutors used the evidence at trial to prove the blood type of the perpetrator. The
police also had semen samples from a rape kit for the victim, including a vaginal swab.
In the second rape, the police had semen evidence from the victim (vaginal swab) and
her clothing.
8
Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679 A.2d 1295, 1296 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996). As the
court stated: "Appellant's conviction rests largely on his own confession which con·
tains details of the rapes which were not available to the public." ld. at 1297.
u The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prohibits a federal court from adjudicating a claim
previously decided in the state courts, but only when the identical claim had been ad·
judkated in the state courts or when the "'federal claim is inextricably intertwined with
the state-courtjudgment [so that] the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that
the state court wrongly decidi!d the issues before it.'" Centifanti v. Nix. 865 F.2d 1422,
1430 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco Inc., 481 U.S. I, 25 (1987) (Mar·
shall,]., concurring)); see D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,473 (1983)
(holding that federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, lack jurisdiction to hear
appeals from state court decisions); Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16
(1923) ("[l]t was the province and duty of the state courts to decide [the constitutional
questions] .... Under the legislation of Congress, no court of the United States other
than this Court could entertain a proceeding to reverse or modify the judgment for
errors of that character.").
'
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Feldman doctrine was inapplicable and that the Brady v. Maryland' due
process duty of disclosure of exculpatory evidence extended to postconviction DNA evidence, regardless of the evidence that supported
the conviction.''
The parties then agreed to a protocol under which the DNA evidence was divided for testing by their respective laboratories. Testing
at each laboratory confirmed that a single rapist had committed both
assaults but that Bruce Godschalk was absolutely excluded as being
that assailant. 12 In February 2002, on a petition for postconviction relief, Godschalk was freed and the criminal charges against him were

10

u.s.

373
83 {1963).
Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. A•.torney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366,
370 (E. D. Pa. 2001 ). Although the district attorney initially appealed the trial court's
rulinf• he ultimately withdrew the appeal.
1
The labOI'atory reports are on file with the authors. The extraordinary scientific
advances in forensic DNA technology and research have provided genetic «fingerprint·
ing" techniques that can detinitively differentiate one person from another. The two
most commonly u~ed tests (Restriction Fragment Length Polymorphism rRFLP") testing and Polymes-ase Chain Reaction ("PCR") testing) can make distinctions even between people who are related. NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, POSTCONVICTION DNA TESTING: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
HANDLING RI~QUESl'S 26-28 (1999), (11J(Iilab!P. at Imp:/ /www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/nij/
177626.pdf. Moreover, very few cells are needed to conduct the testing, and Short
Tandem Repeat ("STR") testing can produce reliable results even with degraded samples. ltL at 23. In Harvey v. Horan, judge Luttig explained the power of cusTent DNA
testing technology:
The current ~tandard STR test examim::s 13 independent regions of DNA
("loci"), set: [NAT'L INST.J FORjUS1"1CE, IMPROVED ANAL\'SIS OF DNA SHORT
TANDE..I\f REI'EA'T'S 2 (2001), although testing at just 8-10 loci usually is suffi·
cient to distinguish between any two persons who arc nru identical ~ins. Sn
[B.J Devlin et al., Statistical Evaluation of DNA ringrnprinting: A Critique of the
NRC's &port. 259 [SCi.] 748 (1993j. In fact, researchel'll have found that the
probability that any two unrelated individuals match at 9 specific loci (the
"matching probability") is approximately 1 in 740 billion. St:e Lucia Sacchetti
et al., Efficiency of Two Different Nine-Loti Slwrt Tandem &peat Systems fur DNA
Tyt1i11g Purposes, 45 CLINICAL CHEMISTRY 178, 182 (1999). Because the standard test probes l3loci (not 8 or 9), it should be correspondingly more powerful. Even the mou eon5erv<~tive estimates h;lve placed tl1is matching probability as high as I in 100 billion, St!8 [NAT't.INST. FOR JUSTICE, supra. at 15). It
is also worth noting that some current generatkm STR systems have matching
probabilities on the order of 1 in l quadrillion. See Mark Benecke, DNA Ty~
ing in Forensic Medicint: and i11 Criminal fnve.stigations: A Cu·rrent Suroey, 84
NATURWISSENSC~IAITEN 181, .183 (1997). For purposes of understanding the
magnitude of these figures of probability, it is estimated that there are only 6
billion persons on the planet. See [http;/ /www.un.org/esa/population/
publications/wpp2000 /highlights. pdf].
Harvey v. Hor.m, 285 F.3d 298, 305 n.l (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig. J., concurring) (dta·
tion omitted).
11
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dismissed. 1' Bruce Godschalk had served fifteen years of his ten-totwenty-year sentence. Although he was eligible for parole at his
minimum of ten years, in all likelihood he would have served his entire sentence of twenty years. In Pennsylvania, parole in sexual assault
cases is largely dependent on the defendant's admission of guilt and
participation in sex offender programs, neither of which the innocent
Godschalk would accept. Bruce Godschalk thus became one of more
than 100 persons exonerated of serious criminal convictions by post14
conviction DNA testing.

B. The Prank Lee Smith Stury
In early 2000, Florida death row inmate Frank Lee Smith died of
cancer. On his deathbed Smith had reasserted his long-held claim to
innocence and continued to demand that the State agree to test DNA
evidence from the crime scene. Smith had been convicted of the 1985
rape and murder of an eight-year-old girl, based largely on a single
eyewitness identification (with no physical evidence of his involvement). In 1989, this sole eyewitness recanted her testimony, alleging
that the police had pressured her and had repeatedly told her that
"Smith was dangerous." 15 Indeed, at the time of the recantation, the
witness named another person, Eddie Lee Mosely, as the killer. Defense lawyers were able to point to other evidence that strongly connected the crime to Mosely, then a prime suspect in a number of sex16
ual assaults and murders.
For years, prosecutors had refused defense requests to test existing
DNA evidence. As Smith lay dying in pain and delirium in a prison
hospital, the slow wheels ofjustice finally ground to a point where testing was authorized. Ten months after his death in prison, in Decemher of 2000, the test result~ cleared Smith of any involvement in the
crime." Prosecutors had claimed that state law did not permit a post-

u The district attorney initially refused to agree to release or dismiss the charges,
stating that he believed that the tests were ~flawed." However, he could provide no basis for this claim other than the assertion that he believed in his detective and had a
full confession. Sara Rimer, Convict's DNA Sways Labs, Not a Determined Prosecutor, N.Y.
TIMFS, Feb. 6, 2002, at Al 4.
B See Innocence Project, at http:/ /www.innocenceproject.org (reporting that, as
of November 26, 2002, 116 persons were exonerated).
~~
Sydney Freedberg, DNA Clears Inmate Too Lflte, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. ] 5,
2000, at JA.
)6

/d.

!7

/d.
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convtcuon challenge based on the outstanding DNA evidence and
had accused the defense lawyers of "playing games" to delay Smith's
18
execution. Upon receiving the test results, the prosecutor stated that
19
she would move to vacate Smith's conviction. He spent fourteen
years on death row and died with his request for DNA testing still in
limbo.
C. The Problem
Godschalk and Smith are representative cases in a growing pool of
DNA exonerations.w They are also representative of the legal struggles over claims to access to DNA for postconviction testing.~ Com1

18

/d.· Under Florida law, there was no right to postconviction access to DNA evidence, even when the evidence could exonerate by proving complete innocence. The
legislature had refused to reform the law prior to Smith's exoneration, and even after
this event Florida's DNA testing statute retains substantial limitations on the circumstances under which prisoners may be entitled to test potentially exculpatory DNA evi·
dence. See Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA
Testing), 807 So. 2d 633, 635 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam) (discussing new state rules governing DNA testing in criminal cases); id. ~t 636 (Anstead,J., concurring in part and
dissenting in pan) (criticizing DNA testing rules for excluding those convicted
through plea barg-.aining because Mplea bargaining often results in many cases of pleas
of convenience or best interests where ... the uncertain risk of trial on ... more seri·
ous charges t:ompels him to accept conviction ... even while maintaining innocence").
19
Freedberg, supra note 15.
2fl &e JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, ACTUAL INNOCENCE 246
(2000) (discuuing the most common factors that led to sixty-two wrongful convictions); Sharon Cohen & Deborah Hastings, Stnlim. Uves in Prisrm: DNA Evidence Is Setting Joree tlut Wrongfully Convicted. But ltWlat Happens to Them Thtn r, CONN. L. TRIB., June
24, 2002, at 1 (detailing an Associated Press study of 110 inmate.~ exonerated by postconviction DNA testing). :fhe Innocence Prqject keeps a current count of the number
of exonerations nationwide on its website.
Innocence Pr(!ject, at
hup://www.innocenceproject.org (last visited Nov. 26, 2002).
1
~ .')ee, e.g., Bradley\'. Pryor, 305 F.3d 1287, 1290-92 (1 lth Cir. 2002) (holding that
plisoner's § 1983 claim seeking DNA evidence was not procedurally barred); Boyle v.
Mayer, No. 02-3124, 2002 U.S. App. LEXfS 19654, at *24 (6th Cir. Sept. 17, 2002)
(denying postconviction effort to obtain DNA on procedural grounds); Kutzner v.
Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (denying postconviction effort to obtain DNA samples on procedural grounds); Harvey v. Horan,
278 F.3d 370,380 (4th Cir. 2001) (denying postconviction request for access to DNA),
reh'g denied, 285 F.3c1 298 (4th Cir. 2002); Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d 366,370 (E.D. Pa. 2001) ("[Prisoner) has a due process right of access to the genetic material for the limited purpose of DNA testing.");
Lee v. Clark County Dist. Attorney's Office, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1187-88 (D. Nev.
2001) (dismis.~ing postconviction effort to obtain DNA samples as unripe, in light of
available state court procedure); State v. EJ-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d 737, 746 (Neb. 2000)
(holding r.hat defendant could not bring request under postconviction statute for DNA
testing that would allegedly show actual innocence, in absence of a showing of consti·
tutional violation); cf Clason v. McKenzie, No. 8:02CV206, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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paring the ultimate outcomes in the two cases, one might expect
moral consensus that Smith is to be avoided and that Godschalk is to be
22
preferred. Few courts or prosecutors directly advance the proposition that the judicial system should permit the incarceration of mani23
festly innocent individuals. In a system where as a matter of constitutional law "[i]t is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not
be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
24
innocent men are being condemned," this preference has a strong
claim to constitutional stature.
In the criminal justice system today, however, the status of postconviction DNA testing is a matter of some contest. It is to that contest that this Article is addressed. In Part I, we will survey the current
practices and policies of prosecutors in responding to requests for
postconviction DNA testing. As that review reveals, the hurdles faced
by Bruce Godschalk and Frank Lee Smith are not inevitable, for many
prosecutors view the importance of DNA testing's potential to exonerate the innocent as equal to its role in convicting the guilty. But
neither are the dilemmas faced by Godschalk and Smith isolated or

13044, at *10 (D. Neb. July 12, 2002) (granting access to DNA samples to test origin of
inculpatory urine in parole revocation proceeding). For a fuller account, see infra
note 133.
2'l Preferred, of course, only with respect to the order for disclosure bt-fore Godschalk completed his sentence.
.
2
~ There are, however, a complex set of procedural barriers to access to the courts
to prove innocence. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (hold·
ing that federal habeas courts may not review a state court's denial of a state prisoner's
federal constitutional claim if the state court decision rested on a state procedural de·
fault); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,503 (1991) (finding prisoner's failure to raise
his Massiab. claim in his first federal habeas petition constituted abuse of the writ). The
1996 amendments to the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241·2255 (2000), 'in the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), Pub. L No. 104-132,
110 Stat. 1214 (codified in scattered sections of28 U.S.C.), severely restricted access to
habeas corpus. Ste JAMES S. LIEBMAN & RANDY HERTZ, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS,
PRACfiCE Ao'lD PROCEDURE 83 (4th ed. 2001) (giving an overview of the federal habeas
corpus process under AEDPA). Indeed, it is not entirely dear that a claim of "factual
innocence" is cognizable in federal habeas corpus. Set Herrera v. Collins, 506 U$. 390,
417 (1993) (finding that, even if there were an actUal innocence federal habeas claim,
the threshold would he ue)l:traordinarily" high and that the prisoner's case fell "far
short of any such threshold"); Burton v, Dorm ire, 295 F.3d 839, 848 (8th Cir. 2002)
(holding that a state prisoner was not entitled to federal habeas relief based on his
claims offactual innocence); see also infra Part Ill (discussing the status of claims of factual innocence).
24
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970); ste id. at 372 (Harlan, J., concuning)
(invoking the "fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free~); see also infra Part III (dis·
cussing the importance of protecting the innocent in our criminal justice system).
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unique, for hostility to postconviction access typifies an important sector of the prosecutorial community. The Article will then address the
principal doctrinal bases for a constitutional right to postconviction
disclosure: prisoners' rights of meaningful access to the courts (Part
II) and the due process obligations of the state to disclose exculpatory
evidence and to avoid arbitrary deprivations of liberty (Part III). In
Part IV, we consider the arguments that have been mounted, both
substantive and procedural, as balancing factors against the constitutional claims, and conclude that in the cases where DNA is potentially
determinatively exculpatory, those factors are unpersuasive.
I. PROSECUTION PRACTICES
Before trial, by rules of criminal procedure and federal constitu~
tional mandate, defendants are entitled access to physical evidence for
forensic testing.w; After trial, however, in the states that have not
adopted statutes giving convicted defendants the right to seek DNA
testing,2f• the disposition of physical evidence rests largely in the discretion of prosecutors, police officers in evidence rooms, and court
clerks.

~' See, e.g.• FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(l)(C)-(D) (requiring the state to provide docutangible evidence, and scientific reports to defendant1 in criminal cases); PA. R.
CRJM. P. 573(8)( 1) (requiring the state to provide the defendant with tangible evidence, among other things); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)
("[S]uppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accu.~ed upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment.");
see alfo infm Part Ill (describing the state's obligation to provide exculpatory evidence).
:til q: freeing Off,.rukrs wit/' Scittnt:t, CJ LETTER: NEWS ON CRJM. JUST. ISSUES (Nat' I
Conference of State Legislatures, Washington, D.C.), Nov. 2001, at 1-2 (detailing legislation in twenty-five states providing for postconviction DNA testing in some circumstances), http:/ /www.ncsl.org/progr.lms/cj/cjl31101.htm; Innocence Project, Legislation, at http:/ /www.innocenceproject.org/legislation/display_legislation.php (last
visited Oct. 12, 2002) (listing twenty-nine state statutes and six pending state statutes
providing for postconviction DNA testing in some circumstances). Even where statutes
provide some access to postconviction DNA testing, the access may be constrained by
short time limits, the exclusion of guilty pie~. or procedural bars.
For reviews of state statutes regulating access to evidence for rorensic testing, see
Rochelle L Haller, The lnfiiXma Prot«twn Act: Why Ftdcral MtaSUres /Uquiring PostConviction DNA Tesling and Preservation oftvideme Are Nudtd in Order to &dw:e the Risk of
Wrongf"l.Execution, 18 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 101, 122-31 (2001) (reviewing New
York, Virginia, California, Illinois, and Texas legislation); Jerilyn Stanley, DNA: Law
Enfrm:r.ment :v Miracle of Twmolog;y: 1'/u Missing Link to Tmth and Justice, 32 MCGEORGE
L. REv. 601, 603-09 (2001) (reviewing California legislation); Karen Christian, Note,
"And the DNA Shall &t You Pree»: ls.nu-.s Surroun&ng Postconviclion DNA Evidencr (tnd tht.
Pursuit of lmux:!J11Cr, 62 OHIO ST. LJ. 1195, 1202-08 (200.1) (reviewing New York and
Illinois legislation).
ment~.
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For many prosecutors, the possibility of freeing wrongly convicted
prisoners is as important an element of the emerging DNA technologies as the possibility of finding and convicting the guilty. Indeed,
when an innocent defendant is incarcerated the wrongdoer remains
unpunished. In 1996, in response to a National Institute of Justice
27
(Nij) report, Attorney General Janet Reno appointed a National
Commission on the Future of DNA Evidence, composed of representatives of law enforcement, prosecutors, and defense attorneys, to recommend standards for postconviction DNA testing. The Commission
developed five categories of cases:
Category l. These are cases in which biological evidence was collected
and still exists. If the evidence is subjected to DNA testing or retesting,
exclusionary results will exonerate the petitioner.
Example (]: Petitioner was convicted of the rape of a sexually inactive child. Vaginal swabs were taken and preserved. DNA evidence
that excludes the petitioner as the source of the sperm will be dispositive of innocence. Note that in a case such as this, the victim's
DNA-also obtainable from the vaginal swab-operates as a control
that confirms that the correct sample is being tested. In addition,
the victim's age and sexual status guarantee that the swab contains
only biological material related to the crime.

Category 2. These are cases in which biological evidence was collected
and still exists. If the evidence is subjected to DNA testing or retesting,
exclusionary results would support the petitioner's claim of innocence,
but reasonable persons might disagree as to whether the results rule out
the possibility of guilt or raise a reasonable doubt about guilt.
Example []: Petitioner was convicted of a homicide. The prosecution argued in closing that blood on a shirt found at petitioner's
home came from the victim. Standard blood typing had shown a
match between the sample and u'ie victim's blood. DNA testing ~hal
excludes the victim as a source of the bloodstains might be helpful
to petitioner's claims but does not prove that he was not guilty.

Category 3. These are cases in which biological evidence was collected
and still exists. If the evidence is subjected to DNA testing or retesting,
the results will not be relevant to a guilt or innocence determination.

27

EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICfED BYjURIES, EXONERATED BY SciENCE: CAsE
STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO EsrABUSH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL (Nat'l

Inst. ofjustice, Series No. 161258, 1996), http:/ /www.ncjrs.org/txtfiles/dnaevid.txt.
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Example []: Petitioner is presendy incarcerated for a gang rape.
The victim testified that seven persons were involved but that she is
not sure that all actually engaged in sexual intercourse. If the vaginal sWabs that were preseived are 'tested and petitioner's DNA protile is not found, the significance of the results will be minimal. It
should be noted, however, that if other participants in the rape can
be identified through DNA testing and petitioner can show the unlikelihood that he ever had any contact with the other participants,
this case may fall into category 1 or 2.

Category 4. These are cases in which biological evidence was never collected, or cannot be found despite all efforts, or was destroyed, or was
preserved in such a way that it cannot be tested. In such a case, postconviction relief on the ?asis of DNA testing is not possible.
Category 5. These'are cases in which a request for DNA testing is frivolous.

Example []: The trial transcript discloses the existence of other
evidence that makes petitioner's claim meaningless, as in a burglary
conviction where petitioner was apprehended at the scene of the
•
211
crt me.

The Commission recommended full access to DNA evidence without
resort to the courts in Category 1 cases, court resolution of any disputes over access in Category 2 cases, and no access in Categories 3, 4,
and 5.:!!1
We do no~ necessarily agree with this entire formulation as a matter of policy. For example, in Category 2, while th~ DNA evidence
might not be determi.native of guilt or innocence, where the prosecutor relied at trial' on a theory inconsistent with this evidence it may
well be extremely strong proof that the wrong result was reached. In
Category 5, if the burglar had cut herself and left blood at the scene,
DNA testing might be fully exonerating, ·even for a suspect found at
that location. Moreover, the NIJ formulations were intended to provide guidelines for postconviction testing of DNA and not to establish
constitutional standards. ln our view, for the reasons set torth in this
Article, postconviction access to DNA evidence is constitutionally
mandated in any case in which DNA tests could either ( 1) definitive1y
demonstrate innocen~~· or (2) ~rovide substantial grounds for a claim

i!ll
2!>

NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA EVIDENCE,

fd. at35.

supra note

11, at 4-6.
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of innocence sufficient to permit the defendant to pursue postconvic·
tion or habeas relief.~
Many prosecutors, even without state legislation, have adopted
31
standards similar to those promulgated by the Nij's Commission.
Some prosecutors have gone further in the proactive use of DNA to
assure the integrity of the criminal justice system. A leader in this approach has been the District Attorney of San Diego who, in July of
2000, directed a review of the cases of all Cl;lrrently inc~rcerated prisoners prosecuted by the offi~e in 1992 or earlier to determine
whether current DNA technology could provide. ex-::merating evidence.~2 Where the ·District Attorney's case review disclosed the existence of untested biological evidence that c.ould raise a "reasonable
probability that, in light of all the. eviden~e, the defe~dant's verdict or
sentence would have been more favorable if the results had been
available at the time of conviction,"· the San Diego protocol provides
for testing of the ~vidence in a fashion mutually agreed upon by the

!10 As a shorthand, we will use the term "demonstrate innocence~ to ·refer to evidence that would meet either prong.
.
" See, e.g., Mar:k Hansen, DNA Reviews Afoot, A.B.A. J., Ap,r. 2001, at 4op, 40 (~Prose
cutors in several jurisdictions, from Long Island, N.Y., to Austin, Texas, will allow any
inmate who requests it access to DNA evidence that could establish his or her innocence. "); Steve Berry, Cooley's First Year Products Few Highs or Lo~s, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3,
2001, at B2 (describing Los Angeles County's forensic science section, wltich "streamline[sJ testing requests from inmates who claim they are innocent"):joe Lambe, Inmate
Wins Fight to Obtain DNA Test, KAN. CllY STAR, Mar. 11, 2000, at A1 ("Jackson County
Prosecutor Bob Beaird offered to provide evidence in the ca&e for ll DNA ~est. 'He may
not have a dear legal right,' Beaird said, 'but he has a dear moral right.' Beaird said
he would allow defense lawyers to obtain tests in cases with critical DNA evidence.");
Paula McMahon, Slate High Court Won't Extend DNA Tuting, SUN-SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale). Oct. 19, 2001, at lA (uThe BroWllrd Stare Attorney's Office has agreed to do
DNA testing in all Death Row cases where the inmate has requested it.");Jonathan D.
Rockoff, I 989 M1trder Case Puts DNA to the Test in R.I., PROVIDENCE J.·BULL, June 25,
2001, at AI (''[Rhode Island Atton1ey General's guidelines] order a prosecutor toreview each request for DNA testing with the defense lawyer making ~e request. If testing is warranted, they would meet with a forensic DNA expert to determine the kind of
test."); Telephone Interview with Mitchell Morri$$Cf, Chief Deputy District Attorney,
Denver, Colo. (Apr. 29, 2002) (on file with the authors) (describing the District Attorney's office policy of allowing postconviction testing upon request where evidence
could prove exculpatory).
~~ Special Directive from Gregory Thompson, Assistant District Attorney, Office of
the District Attorney, County of San Diego, to all District Attorney Staff 2 (July 13,
2000) (on file with the authors); seeJ. Harry Jones, DNA May Shtd New Light on Old Case:
DA Program Is Reviewing Man:~ Murder Conviction, SAN DIEGO UNION-TR.IB., Apr. 8, 2002,
at Al ("Almost 600 cases have been scrutinized, with three qualifying for further investigation .... "). After 1992, DNA testing was routinely utilized before trial in San Diego. Jd.
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prosecutor's office and defense counsel.!!., George "Woody" Clark, one
of the architects of the program, commented, "[W]e're hopeful that
there aren't many cases.... [N]onetheless, we think it's so important ... to our community that if it costs that money ... then we're
willing to spend it ....""'
In Minnesota, Ramsey County Prosecutor Susan Gaertner adopted
the San Diego model to review cases prosecuted before 1995, commenting: "'As prosecutors, we have an ethical duty to seek the truth
and ensure thatjustice is done in every case .... We don't want an
innocent person behind bars any more than defense attorneys do. If a
mistake has been made, DNA technology can help to establish the
truth ..,,:!! Similar reviews have been undertaken by district attorneys in
Brooklyn;!lll Suffolk County, New York;~ Nevada;~ Austin, TexastJ and
7

59

Special Directive from Gregory Thompson, supra note 32, at 3.
NBC Toda.J: Woody Clarlr, San DU!gn Deputy District Att~, Discusses San Diego
Prosecutors Offering Free DNA Testing to Inmates (NBC television broadcast, July 28, 2000).
:!!
Paul Gustafson, DNA Tests May Help Inmates Prove lnnocmce; Ramsey County Is Reviewing Old Convictions to See if New Tests Might Change Outcomes, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Mar. 2, 2001, at IB (quoting Susan Gaertner).
3tl See Daniel Wise, Brooklyn Prosecutors Find Convictions Pass DNA Test, N.Y. LJ., Aug.
6, 2001, at I (describing &rooklyn District Attorney's review of 703 cases in search for
exonerating DNA evidence). However, the review program (at last repon} had uncovered no erroneous convictions:
In 403 (or 57 percent) ofthe 703 cases reviewed so far, the office concluded
that the testing of DNA evidence, even if it were available, would offer no
hope of exonerating an inmate. In another 266 cases (or 38 percent), no forensic evidence that might yield DNA evidence w-...s discovered. And in 21
cases where forensic evidence was tested-all of them sex crimes--no genetic
material was identified.
The bottom line is that of the 703 cases reviewed to date, only two are still
being actively examined ....
/d.
57
See Tina Kelley, L.l. Prosecutor to Review Cases that DNA Tests Could Reverse, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 20, 2000, at 85 (reporting on the Suffolk County District Attorney's decision to review convictions using DNA evidence).
58
See Glenn Puit, Prosecutors .Examining Need. Jar DNA Testing in Murder Cases, LAs
VEGAS REv.:J., Sept. 16, 2001, at 18 (discussing decision of the Southern Nevada District Attorney's office to evaluate whether DNA testing is warranted for past capital
murder cases). The article went on to report:
[T]he district attorney's office has implemented a protocol for scrutinizing all
60 of Southern Nevada's capital murder cases to see if DNA testing could have
made a difference in the outcome ....
"If there is someone in prison that doesn't belong there, we want them out
as much as anyone else,* District Attorney Stewart Bell said.
54

/d.

" See Ed Timms, Travis Completing DNA Review; Wrongful Convictions Prompted Inquiry, Unprecedented in Texas, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 24, 2002, at 45A (describing
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Oklahoma County, Oklahoma.• Other offices voice sympathy for
such "innocence projects" but assert that they are faced with signifi1
cant competing considerations of cost or other priorities!
In September 2000, Orange County, California, District Attorney
Tony Rackauckas initiated a program that issued notices in English
and Spanish to California prisoners in thirty-three prisons, inviting
them to submit applications for forensic testing if they believed that
testing could exonerate them. Upon receipt of an application with a
plausible claim, the district attorney's office places a hold on physical
evidence in the criminal justice system and convenes a review process
Travis County District Attorney's decision to review 450 cases to ascertain whether
DNA evidence could be exculpatory). The program in Austin also yielded very few applications of testing:
Faced with every prosecutor's nightmare-a succession of defendants in
high-profile cases who seJVed time for crimes they didn't commit-Travis
County District Attorney Ronnie Earle took an unusual step 1 I /2 years ago.
His office began a review of old cases in which DNA evidence might be
available to determine whether other defendants were wrongfully convicted.
"We wanted to make sure that, insofar as it was possible for us to ascertain,
that had not happened to anybody else," Mr. Earle said.
A panel ... focused their [sic] attention on 450 convictions before the
mid-1990s .... [It] has identified three cases that merited DNA testing of the
388 cases reviewed so far.
!d.
40

See Good Muve: DNA Testing Project Under Way, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 15, 2002, at
AS (noting Oklahoma County District Attorney's decision to review old cases to see if
DNA testing might make a difference).
In Oklahoma, the review followed a scandal in which police forensics peljury
tainted the convictions of hundreds of Oklahoma inmates. See Arnold Hamilton,
Chtmisl's E:rrtm Slir Fear: Wtrt lnnocmt &eculed7 Questions Forr:e Oklahoma to Dig Through
1,197 Casf.s, DAU.AS MORNING NEWS, Oct. 22, 2001, at JA ("Earlier this year, an FBI
re·.iew of eight cases revealed significant flaws in [the chemist's] analysis. Since ther:,
state lawmakers provided $650,000 for DNA testing, and Gov. Frank Keating ordered
the Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation to review all criminal cases involving [the
chemist]."); see also Mitchell v. Gibson, 262 F.M 1036, 1044 (lOth Cir. 2001) (describing a federal district court's grant of relief on rape and forcible sodomy convictions
because of errors in the expert testimony of Oklahoma's forensic chemist).
•• Sa Telephone Interview with Mitchell MorriSlley, supm note 31 (de3cribing Morrissey's desire to implement a program similar to tht one in San Diego despite the lack
of time to devote to the project); cf. Laura Bauer Menner, Counliu, ln17UJJ.es Receive Aid
Payingfur Pricey Tests, SPlUNGFIELD NEws-LEADER (Mo.), Oct. 21, 2001, at lOA (quoting
district attorneys who had hoped to use a now-revoked federal grant proposal to provide postconviction DNA testing); Richard Willing, Inmate Genelic Testing Scrapped. USA
TODAY, Dec. 26, 2001, at lA (reporting Ramsey County, Minnesota, Prosecutor's disappointment in the justice Department's decision not to provide grants for testing
convicted rapists and murderers who claimed to have been wrongfully identified, and
providing her statement that "[m]aintaining public confidence in our criminal justice
system through DNA is apparently not on [Attorney General] Ashcroft's screen").
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that includes evaluations by a joint panel of representatives of the district attorney's office and the defense bar. ~ According to District Attorney Rackauckas, '"[I]f there's anybody' who's been wrongfully imprisoned, and is sitting there in prison, and his or her case could be
proven innocent, it's worth this entire project."' ~ A similar program
involving a joint review by prosecutors and defense attorneys is un44
derway in Los Angeles.
Not all government officials, however, manifest unalloyed enthusiasm for testing to exculpate the wrongfully convicted. The National
District Attorneys Association (NOAA), while avowing support for "the
use of DNA testing where such testing proves the actual innocence of
a previously conVicted individual," hedges that support with an admonition that "post-conviction relief remedies should protect against potential abuse and ... should be subject to limits on the period in
4
which relief may be sought." D According to the position paper, these
limits should be determined "at the state or local level, where decisions can reflect the needs, resources and concerns of states and
communities. "4n
4

4

42

In cases handled initially by private counsel, a representative of the public defender takes part in the review; in cases handled by public defenders, a private defense
attorney sits on the review panel. Telephone Interview with Camille Hill, Deputy District Attorney and Projec[ Coordinator, Orange County, Cal, (Apr. 30, 2002) (on file
with authors); see Stuart Pfeifer, Team Gd.s 80 Requ.ests !.hat Convictions Bt! Reuinlltd, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at Bl (describing panels, composed of prosecutors and defense
attorneys, that are reviewing convictions).
4
~ Cathy Franklin, fnno«nu Proj«t, CI1Y NEWS SERVICE, Sept 20, 2000, lEX IS, CNS
File; SH Stuan Pfeifer, O.C Ai111.f tri Unearlh Wrongful Con11ictio1Lf, L.A. TIMES (Orange
Coumy Ed.), Sept. 2J, 2000, at Al (reporting Orange County Sheriff's Department lab
director F:llnk. Fitzpatrick's assertion that DNA testing would cost $2500 per test, but
*[i]t's a worthwhile expense ... because it ~::ould help free an inno~::ent man and perhaps identify a criminal who has gone unpunished").
44
See Anna Gorman, Taking a Nt!W Look at Old Gases with DNA, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 12,
2001, at 82 ("[Assistant District Attorney Lisa] Kahn has also started a post-conviction
team to handle requests from convicted felons who claim they are innocent.. ; . The
post-conviction, or innocence, project consists of Kahn and three defense attorneys,
including Deputy Public Defender Jennifer Friedman.").
·~ .NAT'L DIST. AITOil~EVS Ass'N, POLICY POSITIONS ON DNA TECHNOLOGY 8-9
(2001 ), http://www.ndaa-apri.org/pdf/7.22.0 I.DNA%20Policy%20Position.pdf.
~ !d. at 9. The NOM policy reiterates the suggestion that "DNA testing, in most
cases, should be afforded only where such testing was not previously available to the
defendant," and five tim.es stresses the need for postconviction testing programs to adhere to principl~s of "finality." /d. at 8. While the NOM policy "supports the decisions of individual ,prosecution offices to initiate post-conviction DNA testing programs," it cautions that such programs "should recognize the need for finality" and
that they are "not the best approach for all offices." /d. at 10. It goes on to advance
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In 2001, the U.S. Department of Justice announced a program
that would have financed postconviction DNA testing, but it has since
withdrawn this funding. 17 Attorney General Aspcroft•has -renounce9.
48
any intent to reinstate the program.
Prosecutors have sought to narrowly constrain the availability of
49
postconviction DNA testing, citing financial concems, the need for
00
finality in the criminal justice system, the need to protect the system
1
of plea bargaining,5 and the specter of a wave of.frivolous requests.~'

the proposition that "[l]aw enforcement should be permitted to destroy biological
samples from closed cases" with notice to defendants. !d. at 9.
47
The Department of Justice announced initially that the $500,000 (later increased to $750,000) of budgeted funding had been divertkd by the Natiohal Institute
of Justice to assist in the use of DNA technologies to identify victims of the World
Trade Center attack on September 11. ,Willing, supra note, '!!:1; cf. id.. (noting that Justice Department sources report NIJ has played only "a limited role in identifying bodies in New York").
·
In correspondence to Senator Patrick Leahy, the Justice Department identified
four programs to which the $750,000 funding was diverted: an "expert panel" that met
monthly to consult with New York officials; "consultant fees" to a computer expert who
"consulted with the panel"; a pamphlet called "How DNA Can Help Identify lndividu·
alsn; and a project entitled "Innovative Hybridization DNA Typing for Forensic Applications; which, "if successful,w would be of use in future mass disasters. Letter from
Daniel J. Bryant, Assistant Attorney General, to 8_enator Patrick J. Leahy (Feb. 25,
2002) (on file with authors).
48
In response to Senator Leahy's question, "How is it that the Department cannot
find $750,000 in a $30.2 billion budget" to fund postconvidion testing, Attorney General Ashcroft responded that "the Department does not plan to undertake a national
effort to promote and fund post-conviction DNA." S« Facsimile from Manu Bhardwaj,
to Tara Magner &:Julie Katzman (Apr. 24, 2002) (on file with authors) (outlining Ash·
croft's response to Leahy's question).
4
~ Sa, *.g., Letter from Tom Feeney, Speaker of the Florida House of Representa·
tives, to the Florida Supreme Court 3 (Aug. 14, 2001) (opposing extension of DNA
testing because of "unknown and potentially significant fiseal impact" on the state's
budget), http://www.law.fsu.edu/library/flsupct/scOl-363/commentlO.pdf; All Things
Considered: 1"M Right to DNA Testing (NPR radio broadcast, Apr. 17, 2001) (paraphras•
ing Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy for Law of the Philadelphia District Attorney's office, as
saying, "[G]iven the limited resources of prosecutors and forensic scientists who test
the DNA, it's not fair to move convicted felons to the front of the line"), http://
discover.npr.org/f~atures/featureJhtml?wfld=ll21639.
.
!til See, e.g., In rt Braxton, 258 F.3d 250, 257 (4th Cir. 2001) (reviewing the argu·
ment by the warden of the Sussex State Prison in Virginia that disclosure of postconviction DNA evidence would wreak "undeniable damage to federalism and finality"); Let·
ter from Tom Feeney, supra note 49, at 4 ("The ability to reopen pleas, years later, on
evidentiary issues, greatly compromises the interest in finality that is essential to the
continued operation of our criminal justice system."). As was recently reported in Lou·
isiana:
Pete Adams, executive director of the [Louisiana] District Attorneys Association ... said the state cannot be forced· to pay for legitimate errors in the legal
system.

562

UNIVERS/1Y OF Pl!.."NNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 151: 547

Resistance to DNA testing is sometimes couched in sporting
metaphors1" or grounded in an unshakable belief in the accuracy of

"If the DA does a job within his scope of duties, and the police do theirs,
then through an innocent mistake the wrong guy is incarcerated ... why
should the person be compensated?~ ....
. . . "I don't want to appear callous, but when you're making public policy,
you're setting precedent for the future."
Tom Guarisco, Compensation Sought for Ex-Inmate, ADVOC. (Baton Rouge), May 23,2001,
at lB.
61
See Response Brief of Amicus Curiae Florida Prosecuting Attorneys Association,
Jnc. at 8, Amendment to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure Creating Rule 3.853 (DNA
Testing), 807 So. 2d 633 (Fla. 2001) (Nos. SCOl-363 &: SCOl-1649), http://
www.law.fsu.edu/library/f1supct/sc01-363/comment4.pdf (opposing postconviction
testing for defendants who pled guilty because "[t]o allow a [d]efendant to rescind his
or her plea after this exhaustive effort makes a mockery of our judicial system ... [and
to allow such defendants to obtain postconviction testing] would make our system
meaningless, and fraught with fraud"). We wonder whether allowing the continued
incarceration of factually innocent defendants who pled guilty might not also "make[]
a mockery of our judicial system."
2
~ See, e.g., Braxton, 258 F.3d at 259 (concluding that, although the warden argues
that a testing order will "open the tloodgates," he "offers no support for th[at) stark
assertion"); Tom Campbell, DNA Rdest Not Blocked, RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, July
10, 2001, at 85 (reporting the view of the Virginia Attorney General that releasing
DNA evidence would be improper because the "finality of a criminal trial and verdict
should be maintained" and to do otherwise risks opening the floodgates to "a host of
similar ill-advised demands"); Brooke A. Masters, TUJ(J Conservative jurists Back DNA Test·
ing, WASH. POST, Mar. 29, 2002, at A7 ("Joshua Marquis, an Oregon prosecutor and
board member of the National District Attorneys Association, warned that inmates
would abuse a blanket rule on DNA testing.... '(l)t's dangerous when the courts say,
"This is really cool, and therefore we're going to raise it to a constitutional right."'");
Amy Upshaw, judge Thinks Retroactive Gmetic-Testinr lAw Is Constitutiona~ ARK.
DEMOCRA."f-GAZETI'E, Feb. 16, 2002, at 81 (quoting Pulaski County Prosecuting Attor·
ney Larry jegley's justification of his efforts to declare a postcooviction ONA testing
statute unconstitutional on the grounds that "inmates whose cases have long been
dosed will take advantage of any opportunity to get a free ride to Little Rock or to do
something to break up the mundane existence they created for themselves when they
broke the law").
For an interesting pen~pective on the "abuse of testing" argument, compare Toney
v. Cammon, 79 F.3d 693, 700 (8th Cir. 1996) (reviewing prosecutors' opposition to
postconviction DNA testing ordered in a federal habeas case because "granting the
motion 'would open the flood gates for DNA testing"'), with Tim Bry.Jnt, Innocent Man
'Elated' to Be Free,· Vows He Won't 'Dwell on the Negative' of 13 Yean in Prison, ST. LoUIS
POST-DISPATCH, July 17, 1996, at IA (detailing the exoneration of Steven L. Toney,
who was proven innocent of the rape charges for which he had been sentenced io two
life sentences).
55
All Things Considered: The Right to DNA 1P.sting, supra note 49 (reporting that
Ronald Eisenberg, Deputy for Law of the Philadelphia District Attorney, suggested that
"felons can do an end run around the state criminal courts and have their cases reopened," and theorized that "they're just coming in and saying, 'Well, let's take a

DOUBUE HELIX, DOUBLE BIND

2002]

563

54

the guilty verdict. Prosecutors have attempted to induce defendants
to waive their rights to the maintenance of DNA evidence5r. and have
sought to destroy DNA evidence that might exonerate incarcerated
defendants.r.r.
While many prosecutors who refuse testing m~y be sincerely concerned with administrative issues or finality, other factors may color
some decisions. DNA exonerations have disdosed deliberate (and in
some cases criminal) police and prosecutorial misconduct in obtain7
ing the tainted convictions.r- Further, to the extent that DNA exonerations reveal systemic flaws in the criminal justice system (e.g., faulty
eyewitness identifications, false confessions, ineffective defense counsel, and unethical police or prosecutors),!!! some prosecutors may believe that exonerations undermine the credibility of the system. The
look.... I rolled the dire at trial and I lost. And now I'm going to try another tac·
.
tic"').
~· For example, in Mr. Godschalk's case, after testing DNA evidence provided over
district attorney opposition that eventually exonerated the defendant.
the Montgomery County district attorney, Bruce L. Castor Jr., whose office
convicted Mr. Codschalk, ... refused to let Mr. Codschalk out of prison, saring he believe[d] that Mr. Codschalk [was] guilty and that the DNA testing
[was] flawed.
Asked what scientific lY.LSis he had for concluding that the testing was
flawed, Mr. Castor said in an interview today: "I have no scientific basis. I
know because I trust my detective and my tape-recorded confession. There·
fore the results must be flawed .... "
Rimer, supra note 12; if. Watkins v. Miller, 92 F. Supp. 2d 824, 828, 836 (S.D. Ind.
2000) (stating that after postconviction DNA testing exonerated the defendant, the
state "clung to th[e) theoretical possibility" of a theory "completely inconsistent with
the theory of the case that the prosecution presented to the jury"); id. at 840 ("[N]o
one should be sentenced to 60 days in prison, let alone 60 years, on the theory and
evidence the state relies upon in this case to keep jerry Watkins in prison.").
~ .w Lauren Kern, Waivering Rights: Art Prosecutors Cin;wnventing tlu New Law Designed to Prtsert.Je DNA EvidenceP, Hous. PRESS, July 12, 2001, LEXIS, HOUPRS File
("The passage of the DNA bill and other judicial reforms prompted D.A. Chuck
Rosenthal to tell the Houston Chronicle, 'This session is going to rank among the
wont in 25 years."'); id. (noting that the district attorney's office proceeded to "craft[]
a waiver that [sought) to have defendants sign away their rights-not just to the preservation of biological evidence but also to any notice of its destruction and to any re·
lated objections in the future").
so; SeeCherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756,782 (E.D. Va. 2000) (recounting the
prior destruction of DNA evidence at the direction of the state Attorney General's office and issuing an order forbidding the destruction of evidence in light of "the Commonwealth's history of destroying evidence").
7
!• SIM DWYER, NEUFELD&: SCHECK, supra note 20, at 172-82 (discussing instances of
"broken oaths~ by police and prosecutors).
" See id. at xv (..Sometimes eyewitnesses make mistakes. Snitches tell lies. Confessions are coerced or fabricated. Racism tntmps the truth. Lab tests are rigged. Defense lawyers sleep. Prosecutors lie.").
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State of Virginia has opposed making DNA evidence available for testing that might exonerate two men the State has already executed. In
one case, the state Attorney General's office argued that "[c]ontinual
reexamination of concluded cases brings about perpetual uncer9
tainty ... and disparages the entire criminal justice system. ,5 In the
other, the argument was less ornate: if the testing proved exculpatory,
argued the prosecutor, it "would be shouted from the rooftops that
the [C]ommonwealth ofVirginia {had] executed an innocent man."60
The prosecutor in Bruce Godschalk's case reported that he was
"urged by colleagues across the country" to refuse requests for DNA
testing; fellow district attorneys "did not want him to set a precedent
61
by voluntarily releasing evidence." As he put the matter, "[t]here is a
feeling among prosecutors that the integrity of convictions ought to
stand unless there is some reason to think the conviction might not be
good."ro2 Thus, it is not uncommon for convicted individuals to find
themselves in a "Catch-22," where the only road to a showing of innocence leads through DNA evidence in the possession of the prosecutor, and the prosecutor refuses to allow access to the evidence in the
absence of proof of innocence.r''

~~ Brooke A. Masters, NI!W DNA TeJting Urged in Case of Executed Man, WASH. POST,
Mar. 28, 2001, at 81 (omission in original) (quoting Virginia Senior As~istant Attorney
Gener.tl Katherine Baldwin's argument in opposition to a petition by four newspapers
and a charity to obtain DNA evidence that could exonerate Roger Coleman, who had
been executed ten years earlier); Set! Frank Green, DNA TtiSts Not Ukely Ajltrr an &ecution; Va. Dpposi·ng Third Request of Its Kind, RICH. TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 26, 2001, at Al
(quoting Virginia Attomey General's spokespe1"SOn that testing after Roger Coleman
had been executed "shows disresPect for the finalitv of convictions and undemtines
our criminal justice S}'lltem"). Th~ Supreme Court ~fVirginia subsequently held that
the newspapers and charity were not entitled to Coleman's DNA evidence. Globe
Newspaper Co. v. Commonwealth, Nos. 012682 & 012683, 2002 Va. LEX IS 156, at *1415 (Nov. I, 2002).
00
Roger Parloff, Gornr bul Not Forgo~ten, A.\i, LAW.,jan.-Feb. 1999, at 5, 6 (quoting
Deputy Chief Commonwealth Attorney Albert Alberi's argument in opp~~ition to the
testing of potentially exculpatory DNA evidence in the case of joseph O'Dell Ill, who
had been executed in July 1997).
61
Ralph Vigoda, Silent Witness, PHll.A. INQUIRER SUNDAY MAc.,june 9, 2002, at 12,
15.
62 /d.
till Nationally, roughly half of the prisonefll exonerated by DNA testing have been
able to obtain access to DNA evidence with the consent of district attorneys, and half,
like Bntce Godschalk, have had to litigate to obtain access to the exculpatory evidence
that set them free. Innocence Project, Causes & Remedies, DNA, at http://
www.innocenceproject.org/causes/dna.php (last visited Oct. 20, 2002).

.

.
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II. DNA EVIDENCE AND ACCESS TO COURTS

In theory, prisoners in the situations of .Bruce God-;chalk and
Frank Lee Smith can approach courts with claims that they have been
wrongfu1ly convicted. In practice, their ability to seek relief from incarceration is effectively dependent on access to material in the custody of the government, for ~ere is no source of DNA evidence other
than the one that the government has seized. If prosecutors grant access to that material, the prisoner may construc:t an effective plea for
release on the ground that she has been wrong~.dly convicted; by contrast, if prosecutors deny access, the prisoner is effectively barred from .
access to the courts or other tribunals on th.e merits of the case.
. This control over uniquely determinative physic<1.l evidence places
prosecutors in DNA cases astride the only av~nue to relief from unconstitutional impriso.nrpent. When prosecutors arbitrarily deny access to that avenue, they implicate a deeply rooted constitutional
norm: the assurance, as the Court put the matter in Wolff v. McDonnelt that "no person will be denied the opportunity to present to the
judiciary allegations concerning violations of fundamental constitu64
tional rights."
The right of access to the courts, as the Court recently noted in
Christopher v. Harhury, stands at the confluence of three lines of doctrine.~~.'~ The First Amendment's right to petition for redress of grievances protects access to the .courts; indeed, the Court has recently reaffirmed that the right to petition courts for redress against
government wrongdoing is "implied by 'the very idea of a govern00
ment, republican in form.'" The Court's equa~ protection jurispru64

118 U.S. 539, 579 (1974). Stt- gtmerally Larry Yackle, Congressional PIJlui!T to Require
DNA TeJting, 29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1173, 1180-82 (2001) (discussing the right to postconviction testing). The Court has twice recognized during the past Term the consd·
tutional stature of the right to seek judicial redress for wrongs. BE&: K Constr. Co. v.
NLRB, 122 S. Ct. 2390, 2395-96 (2002) (recognizing the constitutional importance of
the right to seek redress of grievances); Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2185,
2186 n.12 (2002) (detailing the constitutional roots of the right ofaccess).
M See Harllury, 122 S. Ct. at 218!5, 2186 n.12 (t:xplaining :that the right of access to
the courts i!i grounded in the First Amendment Petition' Clau.se, the Due Proces.'
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
00
BE & K Conslr. Co., 122 S. Ct. at 2396 (quoting United States v. Cmikshank, 92
U.S. 542, 552 (1876)); see also Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) ("[P]risoners
retain the constitutional right to petition the government ·for the redress of gr:ievances .. , ," (citing johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969))); Hudson v. Palmer, 468
u.s. 517, 523 (1983) c~uke others, prisoners have the constitutional right to petition
the Government for redress of their grievances, which includes a reasonable right of
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dence treats access to courts as a "fundamental interest" that cannot
be denied arbitrarily when addressing claims of right over which the
7
state exercises a monopoly.n Due process has been held to mandate

access to the courts."); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426, 431 (.1978) (holding that the
ACLU's participation in the suit invoked the First Amendment right to petition); Cruz
v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319,321 (1972) (u[P]ersons in prison, like other individuals, have the
right to petition the Government for redress of grievances which, of course, includes
'access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints."'
(quoting Avery, 393 U.S. at 485)); Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404
U.S. 508, 513 ( 1972) rPetitioners, of course, have the right of access to the agencies
and courts to be heard on applications sought by competitive highway carriers."); Mine
Workers v. 111. Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217,222 (1967) ("We start with the premise that the
right ... to petition for a redress of grievances [is] among the most precious of the liberties safeguarded by the Bill of Rights."); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia e:x: rel. Va.
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5 (1964) (holding that railroad workers' First Amendment right
to meet and gain legal assistance "cannot be setiously doubted"); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 437-38 (1963) (mling that a Virginia law.criminalizing the act of telling
another person that her legal right~ have been infringed and referring her to certain
attorneys, such as the NAACP, violates the First Amendment); cJ. Bill johnson's Rests.,
Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741, 743 ( 1983) (recognizing a "First Amendment right to
petition the Government for redress of grievances" but construing that right to exclude "suits based on insubstantial claims"). See generally Carol Rice Andrews, A Right of
Accf.I'S to Court Under tlte Petition Clause of the First Amendment: Defining the Right, 60 OHIO
ST. LJ 557, 580-96, 625-68 (1999) (exploring the use of the Petition Clause to gain
access to courts in the first instance);James E. Pfander, Suvereign Immunity and the Right
to Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right to Pursue Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899, 903-62 ( 1997) (discussing the history of the First Amendment right to petition).
7
n See M.L.B. v. S.L:)., 519 U.S. 102, 113, 136 (1996) (extending the Court's "narrow category of civil cases in which the State must provide access to its judicial proc·
esses without regard to a party's ability to pay court fees" to parental rights termination); Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189, 195-96 (1971) (holding that the State
must pmvide record for an indigent defendant); Williams v. Oklahoma City, 395 U.S. ·
458, 458-59 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that a transcript needed to perfect an appeal
must be furnished at state expense to an indigent defendant sentenced to ninety days
in jail and a fifty-dollar fine lor drunk driving); Long v. Dist. Court of Iowa, 385 U.S.
192, 192-94 (1966) (per curiam) (holding that a transcript must be furnished at state
expense to enable an indigent state habeas petitioner to appeal denial of relief); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305, 310 (1966) (holding that an indigent's right to a transcript at state expense for appeal purposes can apply in civil cases if the interest is sufficiently strong); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 708.{)9 (1961) (holding that a filing
fee to process M.ate habeas application must be waived for indigent prisoner); Burns v.
Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 258 ( 1959) ("The imposition by the State of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent criminal defendants has no
place in our heritage of Equal justice Under Law."); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18
( 1956) ("There is no meaningful distinction between a mle which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which effectively denies
the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all who have money enough to pay
the costs in advance."); seenl.m Penn~'}'lvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) (stating
that the right of "meaningful access to courts" arises from the Equal Protection
Clause).
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that those whom the state seeks to imprison have "meaningful access"
68
to courts to challenge their imprisonment. All three doctrines are
invoked when "systematic official conduct frustrates a plaintiff ... in
preparing or filing suits"; they undergird efforts, like Frank Lee
Smith's and Bruce Godschalk's, to "place the plaintiff in a position to
pursue a separate claim for relief once the frustrating condition is removed.,.69
This right of meaningful access to the courts holds special importance for prisoners. Conviction and incarceration isolate prisoners
from many of the means to protect rights available to those in society
at large. Prisoners cannot vote, their communication with the outside
world is limited, their immediate governors are unresponsive, and
their opportunities to seek legal or political assistance are constrained
by the rules of the institutions in which they are incarcerated. The
opportunity to. seek the protection of the judiciary is often the only
70
The possibility of seeking relief from
available mode of redress.
these disabilities is focused on the courts: a prisoner who is denied
the opportunity to seek judicial relief can claim no other forum to
challenge a wrongful conviction. A state should not be permitted to
63

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 576; see Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11 n.6 (1989) ("The
prisoner's right of access has been described as a consequence of the right to due process of law and as an aspect of equal protection.~ (citations omitted)); Walters v. Nat'l
Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 335 (1985) (discussing First Amendment
and due process rights of court access); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 380-81
(1971) (holding that the refusal to allow appellants into court for divorce proceedings
denied them due process); see also Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. I, 13-17 (1981) (holding
due process requires that the State must pay for blood grouping tests sought by an indigent defendant to enable him to contest a paternity suit). As the Court observed in
M.L.B., "'due process and equal protection principles converge'~ in these cases. 519
U.S. at 120 (quoting Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660,665 (1983)).
69
Harbury, 122 S. Ct. at 2185-86. The11e claims were distinguished in Harimry from
the class of claims that seek damage relief for "specific cases that cannot now be
tried ... no matter what official action may be in the future.~ ld. at 2186. The Harlmry
Court assumed without deciding that such claims were viable, noting that the clainlS
had heen sustained only in circuit courts. ld. at 2186 n.9.
70
See, eg., McCarthy v, Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 153 (1992) ("Because a prisoner
ordinarily is divested of the privilege to vote, the right to file a court action might be
said to be his remaining most 'fundamental political right, because preservative of all
rights.'" (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886))); Hudson v. McMil·
!ian, 503 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) (Blackmun.J., concurring) rtnasmuch as one convicted of
a serious crime and imprisoned usually is divested of the franchise, the right to file a
court action stands, in the words of Yick Wo v. Hopkins, as his most 'fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights."' (citation omitted)); Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579
('The recognition by this Court that prisoners have certain constitutional rights which
can be protected by civil rights actions would be diluted if inmates, often 'totally or
functionally illiterate,' were unable to articulate their complaints to the courts.").
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immunize i£S prison regime from judicial review by the simple expedient of preventing prisoners from reaching the court. And conversely,
the availability of review stands as justification for the state's continuing exercise of i£S punitive authority.
The Court has long held that states may not bolt the door of justice against those in state custody who seek to challenge the terms of
71
their punishment. Half a century ago, Ex parte HuU reviewed a procedure in which the Michigan prison system allowed the filing of petitions for habeas corpus only when an "institutional welfare office[r]"
and a "legal investigator to the Parole Board" determined that the pe72
tition was "properly drawn." After Michigan authorities refused to
mail a petition for habeas corpus drawn by Cleio Hull, and then seized
the petition when Hull attempted to send it to court with his father,
Hull "prepared another document which he somehow managed to
have his father ... file" with the United States Supreme Court.T.I In
response to this final effort, the Court unanimously held the Michigan
regulation invalid, declaring that "the state and i£S officers may not
abridge or impair [the] petitioner's right to apply to a federal court
74
for a wtit of habeas corpus." Shortly thereafter, the Court unanimously made clear that prisoners' rights of access to the courts applied to state as well a, federal postconviction proceedings.'~
Unlike the rights of acces.~ to evidence.under Brady v. Maryland reviewed in Part
Ill below, the right of access to the courts has never been subject to the claim that a
completed ttial extinguishes the right. Compare infra note 82 (evaluating claims that
Brady is only a "ttial" right), ruitll ca5es cited infra note!! 133-34 (applying right of access
to claims for postconviction relief).
'
·
7'l 312 u.s. 546, 548 (i941).
'1!1 /d.
74
Ttl. at 549.
7
~ See Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257-58 ( 1942) (stating that a state prison's
suppression of appeal document.<> would violate the Fourteenth Amendment); see also
Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367, 370-71 (1969) (ruling that the denial of access to a
transcript in a second state habeas corpus action was unconstitutional where the "practical effect den(ied] effective appellate review to indigents"); Long v. Dist. Court, 385
U.S. 192, 194 (1966) (holding that a state may not effectively deny acce'l-s to haheas relief by denying an indigent prisoner access to a free transcript); Lane v. Brown, 372
U.S. 47'7, 479-81 (1963) (holding that a state may not make the availability of tran·
sclipt.s to indigent defendants seeking a writ of error coram nobis dependent on the discretion of the public defender); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (holding
that a state may not make habea~ relief available only to those who can pay the necessary filing fee); White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 762 n.J (1945) (noting that a warden's
refusal to allow prisoners acces.'l to the .courts unless they procured counsel contra·
venecl E.x parte Huli).
Then:Justice Rehnquist had previously taken the position in dissent that even a
right of physical access to the couru arises only by virtue of the preemptive effect of
71
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Prisoners like Bruce Godschalk, of course, are not physically prevented from filing court papers seeking release, but the Supreme
Court has recognized that theoretical opportunity to petition the
courts can be made unavailable in practice by government policies
that burden or effectively prevent the exercise of that right. It has
thus been the rule for a generation that the government may not
structure the terms of imprisonment to foreclose "meaningful access"
711
to courts.
Even the Justices who are skeptical of any affirmative obligation to
provide meaningful access to the courts acknowledge that due process
prevents states from arbitrarily obstructing the efforts of prisoners to
seek redress for wrongful imprisonment, and that an obstruction need
not be total to be unconsti.tutional. 77 Prisoners like Smith and Godschalk seek no affirmative assistance; they only request that prosecutors not prevent access to evidence in the State's exclusive possession.
The closest parallel to the problems we address arose in Procunier
v. Martinez, where the Court invalidated a prison regulation that re-

a

federal habeas corpus statutes, and is thus· inapplicable to access to state court proceedings. Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 839 (1977) (Rehnquist,j .• dissenting) (arguing that there is no fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts); Cruz v.
Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 325 n.3 (1972) (Rehnquist,j., dissenting) (suggesting that right of
·access is only a matter of preemption grounded in the federal habeas statute). Such
an approach would require the reversal of precedents dating back to the mid-l940s
that ~:rotect access to state habeas proceedings.
In .Johnson v. Avery, the Court confronted a rule of prison administmtion forbidding prisoners from assisting other prisoners in "preparing writs." 393 U.S. 483, 484
(1969). Emphasizing the "fundamental importance ofthe writ of habeas corpus in our
constitutional scheme,~ the Court reasoned that "[s]ince the basic purpose of the writ
is to enable those unlawfully incarcerated to obtain their freedom. it is fundamental
that access of prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints
may not be denied or obstructed." !d. at 485. Notwithstanding the fact that the ~~a~e
prisons in Tennessee both permitted prisoners to file their own writs physically unmolested and made available free notarization, id. at 488-89, the Court observed that the
effect of the prohibition of inmate assistance was to "forbid[] illiterate or poorly educated prisoners to file habeas corpus petitions," id. at 487. The rule was unconstitu·
tiona! because it "in substance, deprived those unable themselves, with reasonahle
adequacy, to prepare their petitions, of access to the constitutionally and statutorily
protected availability of the writ of habeas corpus.H /d. al 489. In Wolff v. MdJrmTIIJll,
the Court rejected the proposition that the right of access was limited to habeas petitions, recognizing that, like habeas petitions, actions brought under federal civil rights
statutes "serve to protect basic constitutional rights.~ 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974).
77
Although Justice Thomas's conc~rrence in Lewis v. Casey expressed "doubts
about the validity of Bmmds," even he recognized a constitutional barrier to states "imposing arbitrary obstacles to attempts by prisoners" to challenge their convictions; he
approved cases holding that states may not "abridge or impair" or "deny or obstruct"
the capacity to seek habeas relief. 518 U.S. 343, 365, 379-80 (1996) (Thomas,]., concurring).
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stricted attorney-client interviews with prisoners to members of the
bar and licensed investigators. 7ll Prisoners theoretically could still consult with counsel, but given the remote location of California penal
institutions, the regulation in effect inhibited adequate professional
representation, and thus "imposed a substantial burden on the right
19
of access to the courts." Although "prison administrators are notrequired to adopt every proposal that may be thought to facilitate prisoner access to the courts," an examination of the claimed basis for the
prohibition on paralegals and law students "reveal[ed] the absence of
any real justification. "HO In a unanimous opinion by Justice Powell, the
Court declared:
The constitutional guarantee of due process of law has as a coronary the
requirement that ptisoners be afforded acces!l to the courts in order to
challenge unlawfttl convictions and to seek redress for violations of their
constitutional rights. This means that inmates must have a reasonable
opportunity to seek and receive the assistance of attorneys. Regulations
and pr.tctices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional
representation or other aspects of the right of access to the cmirts are invalid.81

When the state denies access to DNA evidence that could demonstrate
innocence, it likewise imposes a substantial burden on the right of access to the courts. The situation faced by prisoners seeking access to
DNA evidence is not one in which the government has exercised its
power to prevent attorneys from gaining access to prisoners, but one
in which the state prevents prisoners and their attorneys from gaining
access to the evidence that may determinatively exonerate them. But
whether the attorney cannot talk with her client, or cannot examine
determinative evidence, the effect is equally to obstruct the availability
of effective access to the courts.s-J

711

'I'J

416

u.s. 396,419 (1974).

/d. at 420.

"" /d. at 42().21.
HI fd. at4J9.
11:1

In Part Ill, we address the due proce.s.\ claim to this evidence under Brady v.

Maryland and its progeny, which establish a right ~o disclosure of exculpatory evidence.

It is important to note that the claims are constitutionally distinct. The Bmdy line of
cases focuses on the duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to prevent the conviction
and incarcerdtion of the innocent and to ensure that justice is done in criminal cases.
In our view, the Bmdy principles apply in the postconviction context with respect to
DNA evidence. But even if that claim is rejected on the theory that Bmdy is limited to
the trial context, the right to access to the courts would still provide a viable constitutional claim.
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The Supreme Court recently reviewed a line of cases in which
courts held that government officials who concealed, destroyed, or altered evidence to prevent victims of government misconduct from
claiming relief in court violated the constitutional right of access to
85
courts. The Court confronted claims by an American citizen that
U.S. officials had concealed information from her regarding the status
and whereabouts of her husband in Guatemala and thereby prevented
her from seeking judicial relief to prevent his torture and execution. 111
Although it denied damages for the deceptions before it because appropriate relief could be awarded in an underlying suit for the misconduct in question, the eight-member majority in Christopher v. Har-.
bury recognized the strength of the precedents holding that
concealment or destruction of evidence may amount to a violation of
the constitutional right of access to courts. !!!I
The leading case in this line is Bell v. Milwaukee, which upheld a
·cause of action· for denial of access to the courts against police officers
who planted a weapon in the hands of their victim, lied, and conspired with other officers and the district attorney to cover up their
killing of an unarmed civilian.•u; Awarding damages to the victim's
family, whose civil rights action had been thwarted for twenty years by
the perpetrators' efforts, the court observed: "To deny (judicial] access defendants need not literally bar the courthouse door or attack
plaintiffs' witnesses. This constitutional right is lost where, as here,
police officials shield from the public and the victim's family key facts
which would form the basis of the family's claims for redress ...a'

Christopher v. Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2185 n.7 (2002).
!d. at 2181.S3.
as ld. at 2186-87. Justice Thoma<! filed a lone ronc~rrence in the result, asserting
that !.he majority's analysis was unnecessary on the ground that he could "find no basis
in the Constitution for a 'right of access to courts.'" !d. at 2190 (Thomas, j., concur·
ring).
86
746 F.2d 1205, 1260-65, 1279.SO (7th Cir. 1984}, cited in Harbury, 122 S. Ct. at
2186.
87
Id. at 126 J. In a similar line of reasoning, the Sixth Circuit stated:
The right of access in its most formal manifestation protects a person's right
to ph>·sica!ly access the court system. Without more, however, such an irnpor·
tant right would ring hollow in the halls of justice. . . . [T]o what avail would
it be to arm a person with such a constitutional right, when the courtroom
door can be hermetically sealed by a functionary who destroys the evidence
crucial to his case.
Swek.el v. City of River Rouge, 119 F.3d 1259, 1262 (6th Cir. 1997); see also Harrell v.
Cook, 169 F.3d 428, 432 (7th Cir. 1999) ("[O]estruction of evidence can sabotage a
case just as effectively as the conduct described in Bel~ if it effectively deprives the
plaintiff of essential proof."); Oelew v. Wagner, 143 F.3d 1219, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998)
8l
84
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A prosecutor's office that seizes and withholds potentially exculpatory DNA samples does not orchestrate a malign conspiracy.· But its
policy deprives prisoners of access to crucial evidence, thus denying
the opportunity to present claims of innocence.
There are, of course, limits on the obligation of the government
to facilitate challenges to custody. The government need not gather
evidence in the first instance,!§~ and need not provide counsel in postconviction proceedings. 119 In Bounds v. ·Smith, however, the Court
traced decisiops "requir[ing] remedial measures to insure that inmate
access to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful," and concluded that states are required to "shoulder affirmative obligations to
90
assure all prisoners meaningful access to the courts." In particular,
the Court held that for prisoners "seeking new trials, release from
91
confinement, or vindication of fundamental civil rights," the access
right required that prison regimes make available law libraries or
. Ient measures:'!)!
o th er equ1va
Prisoners' rights have not been favorites of the Rehnquist Court,
and the level of "affirmative obligation" that the access right imposes
has been a matter of controversy. · In Lewis v. Casey, the Court over("[T)he defendant:; violated the [plaintiffs'] right of meaningful acces.'l to the courts by
covering up the true facts surrounding (the death of one of the plaintiffs]."); Nielsen
v. Clayton, Nos. 94-1620,94-1765 & 94-1766, 1995 U.S. App. LEX1S 17126, at *19 (7th
Cir. July 11, 1995) (holding that a violation of the right of access to the courts may exist even if a party has successfully accessed· a court, if that access was ineffective due to
concealment of the fact~); Chrissy F. v. Miss. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 925 F.2d 844, 851
(5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a child's allegations that the welfare department failed to
report her repeated statements that she had been sexually abused could state a valid
claim of denial of access to the courts); Ryland v. Shapiro, 708 F.2d 967, 974-75 (5th
Cir. 1983) (holding that the eleven-month concealment alleged in the complaint was
sufficient for a jury to find a denial of constitutional rights). But 5ee Vasquez v. Hernandez, 60 F.3d 325, 329 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that not every deception rises to the
level of a constitutional violation).
The position of Judge King, concurring in Haro9 v. Horan that the access claim
was barred because, "even without access to the evidence, [the prisoner] is fully capable of taking advantage of postconviction legal options such as habeas corpus and
clemency.~ 278 F.3d 370,386 (4th Cir. 2002) (King,J., concurring), adopts a formalistic aerroach to the right of access that is wholly at odds with the case law.
•V.11 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984) ·(holding that police
had no duty to preserve breath samples taken to establish a Dwt violation).
"'' See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. l, 10 (1989) (holding that the right to appointed counsel extends only to the first appeal, even when the death penalty is im·
posed); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (holding that the right to appointed counsel extends no further than the first appeal).
!MI 430 u.s. 817,822,824 (1977).
'" !d. at827.
~J'l
!d. at 826-30.
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turned a lower. court's decree that relied on earlier access cases to
guarantee prisoners extensive entitlements to law libraries, law librarians, and legal assistance." The Lewis Court's five-member majority
disavowed the proposition that states are required to confer "sophisticated legal capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely
illiterate prison population"94 regarding an unlimited spectrum of
causes of action, and held that in any event the decree failed because
no plaintiff had established standing by showing that he had a nonfrivolous claim of systemwide constitutional violation the judicial vindication of which could be facilitated by the claimed relief.95
Lewis substantially limited the assistance that states must provide
to inmates, and it imposed the anomalous requirement that inmates
identify a legal claim before asserting the right of access to legal assistance in order to determine whether they have a legal claim. Nonetheless, the Lewis Court reaffirmed the proposition that, for prisoners
who can identify colorable claims, prison regimes must provide a
96
"'meaningful [right of] access to the courts.'" It limited that right to
suits seeking to challenge the fact or terms of a prisoner's confinement "The tools [Bounds] requires to be provided," wrote Justice
Scalia for the mcyority, "are those that the inmates need in order to
attack their sentences, directly or collaterally, and in order to chal97
lenge the conditi?ns of their confinement."
518 U.S. 343,346-48 (1996). ~the majority described the decree, it governed
the times that libra1ies were to be kept open, the number of hours of library
use to which each inmate was entitled (10 per week}, the minimal educational
requirements for prison librarians (a library science degree, law degree, or
paralegal degree), [and] the content of a videomped legal-research course for
inmates .... With respect to illiterate and non·Engtish-speaking inmates, the
injunction declared that they were entitled to "direct assismncc" from lawyers,
pa~legal!' or "a sufficient number of at least minimally trained prisoner Legal
Asststants ....
/d. at 347-48 (quoting the injunction issued by the United States District Court for the
District of Arizona).
!H /d. at 354.
9
~ /d. at 360.
:•; ld. at 351 {quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 830); see id. at 350 (acknowledging the
• (already we!!-established) right of access to the courts" (emphasis omitted)).
97
/d. at 355; see also Shaw v. Murphy, 532 U.S. 223, 231 n.3 (2001) (w[l)nmates
have a right to receive legal advice from other inmates only when it is a neces.~ary
'means for ensuring a "reasonably adequate opportunity to present claimed violations
of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.'"" (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at B50.5J
(quoting Bounds, 430 U.S. at 825))).
This limit on the constitutional claims that can command a right of access is consistent both with the Court's historical concern (as a matter of due process) with ensuring that prisoners' claims of abuse are not stiHed by the alleged perpetrators and with
93
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Some commentators read Lewis as the beginning of the end of any
98
constitutional protection of prisoners' access to the courts. They are
mistaken. The requirement that' plaintiffs demonstrate colorable underlying claims has often stood in the way of broad injunctive relief,
but it has not eliminated the substantive obligation to allow prisoners
meaningful access when such claims exist. Lower courts have continued to find viable causes of action when prison regimes demonstrably
prevent prisoners from seeking redress from unconstitutional confiriements.99
Regardless of the level of affirmative assistance to which prisoners
are entitled, under the Court's precedents the government may not
100
"unjustifiably obstruct" access to judicial relief. When the government seizes ·unique and potentially determinative evidence, making it
unavailable to the prisoner whom it may exonerate, a prosecutor cannot constitutionally be empowered to deny access to the evidence for
no reason better than a desire to avoid challenge to the verdict she
previously won. As we will see in Part IV, a careful examination of the
justifications for denial of access will often reveal, as in Martinez, an
01
"absence of any real justification" for the government's actions.'
treating access claims of the civilian population, in cases such as M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519
U.S. 102 (1996), as particularly important for the protection of fundamental rights.
!Ill See, e.g., Susan N. Herman, Slashing and Burning Ptisonm' Rights: Congress and tile
Supreme Court in Dialogue, 77 OR. L. REV. 1229, 1262-64 (1998) (discussing the possibil·
ity that Congress might be able to restrict prisoners' access to the courts for all but the
"core areas the Court favors"); Christopher E. Smith, The Malleability of Con.ftitulional
Doctrine and Its Ironic Impact on Prisonm' Rights, ll B.U. Pun. INT. LJ. 73, 90-91 (2001)
(arguing that the decision in Lewis created a "Catch-22" situation by imposing a strict
standing requirement that prisoners must first file legal papers to demonstrate they
Jack the resources and the capability to file such papers).
ll'J Su. ~.g.. Cody v, Weber, 256 F. 3d 764, 769 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that a cause
of action existed when a prisoner's legal papers were searched and read); Come;.; v.
Vernon, 255 F.3d 1118, 1127·28 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that a prisoner's First
Amendment rights were violated when the Idaho Department of Corrections tried to
transfer him after he complained about the law library); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d
220, 22+25 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding a cause of action when a prisoner was segregated
from the general inmate population after filing civil right.~ laWlluits); May v. Sheahan,
226 F.3d 876, 883 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a cause of action existed when a pris. oner detained in a hospital was prevented from making a court appearance);
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 395 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that a cause of ac·
tion existed when a prisoner was harassed by prison officials after helping another
prisoner gain access to the courts); Goff v. Nix, 113 F.&l 887, 892 (8th Cir. 1997)
(holding that a prisoner's rights were violated when his legal papers were taken,
thereby denying him access to the courts).
100
Procunierv. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396,419 (1974).
101
ld. at 421; see discus.~ion infra Part IV (ev-J.luating the opposing arguments
grounded in finality, avoidance of administrative burdens, and federalism).
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Not every claim of access to DNA is constitutionally protected.
The primary significance of Lewis, as the Supreme Court recently obsenred in Christopher v. Harbury, lies in its adoption of the proposition
that the right of court access is "ancillary to the underlying claim,
without which a plaintiff cannot have suffered injury by being shut out
of court." 102 The plaintiff, therefore, "must identify a 'nonfrivolous,'
'arguable' underlying claim" that is burdened by the challenged gov10
ernment restriction. ' In cases like Godschalk and Smith, the underlying claim is one of factual innocence, which may be vindicated either
in state or federal court if the DNA evidence proves exculpatory.
The parameters of this "nonfrivolous and arguable" test, which
senres as the gateway to a right of access, are not clearly articulated ·in
Harbury, but the language has a striking parallel in the Court's in
forma pauperis jurisprudence, which permits dismissal only when the
complaint is factually "frivolous" or without arguable merit as a legal
matter. 104 The well-settled approach to determining frivolousness in
this context allows a court to "dismiss a claim as factually frivolous only
if the facts aJleged are 'dearly baseless,' a category encompassing allegations that are 'fanciful,' 'fantastic,' and 'delusional. "' 10!; The Court
has cautioned that an "in forma pauperis complaint may not be dismissed ... simply because the court finds the plaintiff's allegations un106
likely. " Some improbable allegations might properly be disposed of
on summary judgment, but to dismiss them as frivolous without any
factual development is to disregard the age-old insight that many allegations might be "'strange, but true; for truth is always strange,
107
[s]tranger than fiction.'"
The stories of Bruce Godschalk and Frank Lee Smith counsel a
similar caution. It may seem strange that a defendant would confess
.to a crime he did not commit; it is both strange and unfortunate that
an eyewitness can identify definitively, under oath, the wrong person
as an assailant. Yet once DNA evidence is subjected to testing, these
"strange" claims have been shown to be scientifically and demonstrably true.
Ul'l

Christupher v. Harbury, 122 S. Ct. 2179, 2186-87 (2002).

Ia!

/d. at2187 (quoting Lewis, 518 U.S. at 353 & n.3).
SH 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (i) (2000) (providing for dismissal of fri\'olous

104

actions in in fonna pauperis proceedings).
10
~ Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992) {quoting Neitzke v. Williams,
490 u.s. 319,325-28 (1989)).
100
Id. at 33.
107
/d. (quoting LORD BYRON, Canto XIV, in 3 BYRON'S DON jUAN 410, 455
(Truman Cuy Steffan&: Willis W. Pratt eds., Univ. ofTex. Press 1957) (1823)).
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Denial of access to DNA samples by prosecutors should be subject
to special scrutiny for a final reason under the Court's right to access
precedents. The Court has recently emphasized the First Amendment
concerns that arise when the government can "truncate" the representation of clients challenging government authority: "We must be vigi·
lant when Congress imposes rules and conditions which in effect insu·
109
late its own laws from legitimate judicial challenge. " So, too, Justice
Harlan observed that a system that gave unreviewable discretion to a
public defender to deny access to trial transcripts for indigents seeking collateral relief "falls. short of ·the requirements of due process,"
since "[i]t ignores the human equation not to recognize the possibility" that trial counsel might be reluctant to impeach a verdict in which
100
she participated.
Given the tenacious belief that prosecutors often
manifest in the accuracy of the verdicts they have won, it would
equally "isnore the human equation" to rely entirely on their discretion in granting or denying access to DNA evidence that could dem110
onstrate innocence.
III. DNA EVIDENCE AND THE SEARCH FOR TRUTH
The obligation to allow access to postconviction DNA evidence is
supported by a second, complementary set of legal principles arising
out of the constitutional commitment to insuring against miscarriages
of criminal justice. Altho':lgh most directly addressed to the obligations of fairness at trial, due process principles that require a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to accused defendants before
conviction extend appropriately to access to DNA evidence that could
demonstrate innocence after conviction.

IIlii

Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001 ).
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 485 (1963) (Harlan,J., wncurring); see id. (Stew·
art, J.) ("The provision before wl confers upon a state officer out~ide the judicial system Rower to take from an indigent all hope of any appeal at all.~).
10
CJ. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,450 (1971) (~Without disrespect
to the state law enforcement agent here involved, the whole point of the basic rule
[requiring neutral magistrates to issue search warrants] is that prosecutors and policemen simply cannot be asked to maintain the requisite neutrality with regard to
their own investigations ... .");Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948) (hold·
ing that probable cause must be determined by neutral magistrates and not ujudged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime").
100
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A. The Law ofAccess to Evidence in Criminal Justice

During the last two generations, t:pe Suprem(! Court has construed
the Due Process Clause to establish '"what might loosely be called the
111
area of constitutionally guaranteed access to eVidence.'"
Moving
from a "gladiatorial" model in which each party was free to withhold
information from its opponent or the court toward a sys~em in which
112
the goal is "ascertaining the truth about criminal accusations," the
Court has constrained prosecutors' previously unfettered discretion by
imposing a duty to provide exculpatory evidence to defendants.
113
In the seminal case of Brady v. Maryland, the Court built upon
the previously established prosecutorial duty to refrain from the knowing use of peljured testimony and the deliberat:e suppression of ex114
culpatory evidence, and ruled that as a matter of due process a defendant in a criminal case is entitled upon request to disclosure from
the prosecution of all "favorable" and "material" evidence in the
115
Suppression of such evidence has been recogState's possession.
nized as a violation of due process principles, "irrespective of the good
faith or bad faith of the prosecution,"llt' since it ':'ndermines the fairness of the process by which criminal punishment is imposed. The
"Brady rule" has become a key structural element of modem criminal
procedure. AJong with significant changes in court rules and statutes,
·it has supplanted prior adversarial leeway in pretrial disclosures in the
117
criminal justice system.
J

Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 5l. 55 ( 1988) (quoti~g United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).
m Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,439-40 (1995).
n• 37l U.S. 83 (1963).
114
SN Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110-12 (1935) (holding that the use of
peljured testimony and suppression of exculpatory evidence amounted to a denial of
due Rrocess).
1
~ Brady, 373 U.S. at 87.
116 /d.
111

111

For early accounts advocating broader pretrial disclosures, see William J.
Brennan ,Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting /:."vent ur Quest for Truth? A Progress Refmt,
68 WASH. U. L.Q. I, 15-16 (1990); William J. Brennan, Jr., Th8 Criminal Prosecution:
Sporting Event or Quest for Truth7, 1963 WASH. U. L.Q. 279, 282; AbrahamS. Gold3tein,
'lne State and the Accilsed: Balance of Advantagr in Criminal Prrxtdtm, 69 YALE LJ. 1 149,
1180-85 (1960); Roger J. Trdynor, CtTOUnd Lost and Found in Criminal Discovery, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 228, 229-30 (1964). But Sf' United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649
(S.D.N.Y. 1923) (Hand,j.) (denying the defendant's motion to inspect the grand jury's
minutes); State v. Tune, 98 A.2d 881, 886-91 (NJ. 1953) (Vanderbilt, CJ.) (holding
that the defendant did not have the pretrial right to see either the statements of others
to the prosec:ution or his own confession). In the Nuremburg War Crimes Trials,
American prosecutors faced the embarrassment of a Soviet protest that American rules
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In the forty years since Brady, the Court has continued to hold
that due process does not require the prosecution to disclose all information in its possession, stressing that the constitutional mandate is
1111
not a substitute for rules of discovery in criminal cases.
On the
other hand, the cases have defined the concept of "materiality" to
cover all evidence that is directly exculpatory, impeaching in nature,
or of a quality that could make a probable difference in the trial's out119
come.
Kyles v. VVhilley 1ro extended Brady to information held by police investigators but unknown to prosecutors. Like Brady, it was anchored
121
in the "early 20th-century strictures against misrepresentation" and
the "'suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused. "' 122 The Court emphasized that Brady was "triggered by the potential impact of favorable but undisclosed evidence. "123 Notwithstanding the claim that prosecutors had no actual knowledge of the
evidence at issue, the Court declared that "the prosecutor ha[d] the
means to discharge the government's Brady responsibility if he
124
(would]."

of discovery were unfair to defendants. See Hon, Robert H. Jackson, Some Problems in
Developing an International tegal System, 22 TEMP. L.Q. 147, 150.52 ( 1948) (commenting
on the validity of the Soviet objections).
118
Set United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("[The Brady rule's) pur·
pose is not to displace the adversary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered, but to ensure that a miscarriage ofjustic~ does not occur."). Historically, discovery in criminal ca.~s was quite limited. Set~, B. g., Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 317
(4th Cir. 2002) (Luuig,J., concurring) (discussing the traditional adversarial practices
of ~concealment" and ~g-c~mesmanship"). While modern ntles have generally expanded the scope of discovery, and courts now reject the "sporting theory of justice,"
there is no requirement that all investigative material in the possessiOn of the police or
prosecutor be disclosed. Judge Luttig suggests that perhapA there should be. See id.
(Luttig,J., concurring) (explaining that, in cases in which exculpatory evidence would
prove beyond any doubt the innocence of the defendant, the principle of elementary
fairness requires post-trial production).
,,, ~Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 432-38 (1995) (tracing the history and scope
of the Brady line of cases); cj United States v. Ruiz, 122 S. Ct. 2450, 2455-57 (2002)
(finding no due process obligation on the part of the prosecution to disclose "impeaching" material prior to entering a plea agreement with the defendant when the
government has provided all information regarding the defendant's "factual innocence~).
120

514 u.s. 419 (1995).

m ld. at432.
•u /d. (quoting Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963)).
IU /d. at 434,
14
i
/d. at 438.
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Suppression of evidence was held to violate due process principles
even if there was otherwise sufficient evidence to convict; the prosecutor has the duty to "learn of any favorable evidence known to ... others acting on the government's behalf in the case, including the police. " ~ The Court did not equivocate regarding the purpose and
expected results of this rule:
1

This means, naturally, that a prosecutor anxious about tacking too
close to the wind will disclose a favorable piece of evidence. This is as it
should be. Such disclosure will serve to justify trust in the prosecutor as
Mthe representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done." And it will tend to preserve the criminal trial, as distinct from the
prosecutor's private deliberations, as the chosen forum for ascertaining
1211
the tmth about criminal accusations.
·

Most recently, in United States v. Ruiz., the Court rejected a defen. dant's due process-Brady claim that a guilty plea entered without disclosure by the prosecution of "impeaching" material rendered the
127
plea involuntary. As part of a "fast-track" plea bargaining program,
the government offered certain defendants reduced sentence·recommendations in exchange for a waiver of indictment and trial. 1214 Prosecutors committed themselves to disclosing any information relating to
the factual innocence of the defendant, but did not reveal impeaching
evidence or material that could support an affirmative defense. 121J The
Court recognized that the due process considerations that support a
right to exculpatory and impeachment material were directly concerned with assuring a fair trial, but, as in other procedural contexts,
resolving the question of whether due process mandated disclosure of
this information required a balancing of the "private interest" at stake,
the ..value of the additional safeguard," and the "adverse impact ...
upon the Government's interests. "1ll<l The Ruiz. Court determined that
any interest on the defendant's side was outweighed by significant
prosecutorial interests, including the possible disruption of ongoing
investigations, exposure of witnesses to harm, and the commitment of
significant reso·urces that might undermine the plea bargaining pro-

12

~ /d. at 4!J7.

120
i

/d. at 439-40 {omissions in original) {citations omitted) (quoting Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78,88 (1935)).
IV 122 s. Ct. 2450, 2453 (2002).
l:lll ld.
129
150

/d.

Id. at 2456.
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gram. 1' 1 It is noteworthy that the government assured the Court that it
would provide evidence of factual innocence, even at the plea stage. ~
In the postconviction context, where a defendant seeks disclosure
of specifically identifiable DNA material that could demonstrate innocence, the Ruiz balance looks substantially different. As we develop in
detail below, the interests of the defendant, though surely diminished
by reason of a criminal conviction, still surpass any countervailing in~
terests of the prosecution. Applying Brady, courts have found a postconviction right of access to DNA materials in the possession of the
prosecutor. 1:1S If prosecutors must deliver exculpatory evidence to a
1

131

/d.

!d.
~~~ E.. g., Godschalk v. Montgomery County Dist. Attorney's Office, 177 F. Supp. 2d
366, 369-70 (E. D. Pa. 2001) (finding a right to postconviction DNA testing despite the
defendant's "confession"); Harvey v. Horan, No. 00-1123-A, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
9587, at *15-16 (E.D. Va. Apr. 16, 2001) ("[D]enying the plaintiff access to potentially
powerful exculpatory evidence would result in ... a miscarriage of justice."), rev'd, 278
F.3d 370 (4th Cir.), mhg denied, 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002); Charles v. Greenberg,
No. 00-958, 2000 U.S. DisL LEXIS 18349, at *12 (E.D. La. Dec. 13, 2000) (noting that
the court pr~:viously refused to dismiss the defendant's complaint for injunctive relief
and that this sparked negotiations between the parties that ultimately led to the defendant's access to the mpe kit and to a finding that he had been wrongfully incarcer·
ated)i State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793, 806-07 (Conn. 1992) (granting access to DNA
where there was reason to doubt that the evidence would be cumulative); People v.
johnson, No. 85134, 2002 Ill. LEXIS 301, at *14 ([II. Apr. 18, 2002) (considering the
defendant's claim that the United States Constitution mandates access to exculpatory
evidence on collateral revit:W, but ultimately ordering access to DNA evidence on the
ba.~is ora state statute); Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 707-08 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992) (allowing postconviction DNA testing on fundamental fairness grounds); Dabbs v. Ver·
ga.ri, 570 N.Y.S.2d 765, 768 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (holding that any evidence with "high
exculpatory potential" !lhould be discoverable after conviction); Commonwealth v.
Reese. 663 A.2d 206, 208 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (allowing postconviction DNA testing
where identification wall at iaue and no other physical evidence connected rhe defendant to the scene); Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 423-25 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1992) (allowing postconviction DNA testing with the assumption that the samples still
exist); cf. Clason v. McKenzie, No. 8:02CV206, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13044, at *10 (D.
Neb. july 12, 2002) (gnmting acceSII to DNA samples to test origin of inculpatory urine
in parole revocation proceeding); Lee v. Clark County Dist. Attorney's Office, 145 F.
Supp. 2d 1185, 1188 (D. Nev. 2001) (abstaining from adjudication of access complaint). But see State v. Frazier, No. 30805884Dl, 1995 Del. Super. LEXIS 474, at *14
(Aug. 3, 199!\) (~ro general, there is no O;lnstitutional right to DNA testing .... ");
State v. El-Tabech, 610 N.W.2d 737, 747-48 (Neb. 2000) (denying postconviction DNA
testing because ~there is no existing procedureM to permit testing and ~there is no constitutional right to testing").
Court.~ have held that, as of 1994 and 1997, there was not a "dearly established"
right to DNA testing. See Harrison v. Abraham, No. 964262, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
6894, at *53 (E.D. Pa. May 16, 1997) (granting qualified immunity to police officers
who had a duty to provide evidence to the prosecutor and not the defendant); Roberts
v. Toal, No. 94-CV-0608, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1836, at *17 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 20, 1997)
132
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defendant before trial even without request, they should at least be
obligated to provide access to evidence that could prove innocence
11
post-trial upon specific request of the convicted defendant. s

(granting qualified immunity in damages claim by exonerated plaintiff, but noting that
defendants did not afthmatively deny access to tests); Brison v. Tester, No. 94-2256,
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18193, at "'4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 1994) (granting qualified immunity in damages claim by exonerated defendant).
Student commentators have uniformly approved the extension of Bmdy to postconviction production of DNA samples. See, e.g., Jennifer Boerner, Student Article:
Other Rising Legal Issues, In the Interest ofjustice: (.ranting Post-Conviction DeoxyriiHJnucleic Acid (DNA) Testing to Inmates, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 1971, 2001 (2001) (concluding that there are no justifications for barring postconviction DNA testing);
Cynthia Bryant, Note, Wilen O'M Man's DNA Is Another Man 's Exonerating l:.."viclence: Compelling Consensual Sexual Pannm of Rape Victims to Provide DNA Sf~mples to Postconviction
Petitioners, 33 CoLUM. J.L. &: Soc. PROBS. 113, 122-25 (2000)' (explaining the difficulties
in obtaining postconviction testing· through standard procedural methods); Donna
Buchholz, Comment, Modem Day Chliteau D'Ifin Horida1 Collecting Dust on tiUI SIUilves of
Justice: Potentially Exculfmtury DNA /:.vidence Waits for a Turn in the Horida Sunshine, 30
STETSON L. REV. 391, 423-26 (2000) (urging that the quest for truth should be par.t·
mount in postconviclion evidentiary disputes); Christian, supra note 25, at 1240-41 (arguing that the potential exculpatory value of DNA trumps finality concerns); David
DeFoore, Comment, Postcunviction DNA Testing: A Cry for justice from the ~ongly Convided, 33 TEX. TECH L. REv. 491, 525-27 (2002) (listing concerns that legislators should
address in fashioning appropriate remedies); Developme'ftts in the l..artJ-Cunjrrmting the
New Challenges of Scientific f.-vidence, 108 HARV. L. REv. 1481, 1572-73 ( 1995) (describing
the resistance that defendanL'I have met in seeking postconviction DNA testing). Pro·
fessor Yackle has also argued that DNA's dispositive quality may compel postconviction
testing. See Yackle, ~upra note 64, at 1180-82 (arguing that DNA's dispositive quality
makes its use constitutionally compelling) ..
tM Indeed, precedent supports an affirmative disclosure obligation when exculpatory evidence surfaces after conviction. See Monroe v. Rlackbum, 476 U.S. 1145, 1149
(1986) (Marshall, .J., dissenting) ("It would hardly make sense to hold the State to a
spelial duty to disclose exculpatory c•idence in any advenarial proceeding and then
permit the State to avoid this obligation by suppressing the very evidence that would
enable a detendant to trigger such proceedings."); see also Watkins v. Miller, 92 F.
Supp. 2d 824, 849 n.15 (S.D. Ind. 2000) (recognizing district court opinions extending
the Brady obligations through proceedings for post-trial motions); Monroe v. Butler,
690 F. Supp. 521,525 (E.D. La. 1988) (rejecting, on remand, the argument that Brady
is limited to preconviction proces.ses).
The Court's balancing of the SLate's interests and private interests in Ruiz, 122 S.
.Ct. at 2453, point!l in the same direction. Even when physical evidence does ool by it·
self demonstrate innocence in particular cases, the balance could mandate disclosure
when the burdens on the prosecution are negligible and the probative force of the
evidence is powerful but not determinative. The recent developments in the Central
Park jogger case in New York City exemplify such a situation. See Robert D. McFadden
&: Susan Saulny, DNA in Central Park jogger Case spurs Call for New Review, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 6, 2002, at 81 (discussing DNA evidence that implicated a new suspect who confessed to the crime but would not determinatively exculpate the five men convicted of
the rctpe).
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Recently in Ha'TVf:J v. Horan, ~. both the procedural and substantive
aspects of the Brady postconviction DNA disclosure claim generated
vigorous debate among the judges of the Fourth Circuit. A majority of
the panel that initially heard argument determined that the case was
procedurally barred!sa A concurring judge would have held for the
plaintiff on the procedural issues but found the Brady theory inapposite.157 The plaintiff's application for rehearing was ultimately mooted
because Virginia adopted a statutory right to DNA testing; however,
judge Luttig wrote a comprehensive concurring opinion supporting
the prisoner's constitutional claim, concluding:
[A]t least where the government holds previously-produced forensic evidence, the testing of which concededly could prove beyond any doubt
that the defendant did not commit the crime for which he was convicted, the very same principle of elemental fairness that dictates pre-trial
production of all potentially exculpatory evidence dictates post-trial production of this infinitely narrower category of evidence. And it does so
out of recognition of the same systemic interests in fairness and ultimate
1
truth. :~~~

It is our view that judge Luttig and the cases that adopt this. theory are
entirely correct. Although the problem of DNA evidence requires application of due process principles in a new context, neither the fact
that untested DNA evidence is indeterminate, nor the fact that the
prisoners have already been convicted dissipates the mandate of due
process that the government make the evidence available where it
could demonstrate innocence.
B. Brady and Untested bvidence

Brady itself concerns evidence whose meaning is known to prosecutors and whose exculpatory qualities can be evaluated directly by a
reviewing court. It thus differs from untested DNA evidence whose
evidentiary import is indeterminate. In a series of cases applying the
Brady rule, however, the Court has faced the issue of the due process

278 F.3d 370 (4th Cir.), t-eh'gdenitd, 285 F.3d 298 (4th Cir. 2002).
S~e id. at 379 (Wilkinson, CJ.) (dismissing prisoner's action ~as a successive
(habeas] petition brought without leave of courtw). The opinion also expressed the
view that the grant of testing was substantively improper, a view which appears technically to be dicta. But see Harvt!J, 285 F.3d at 31 J-12 nn.2-3 (Luttig,J., concuning) (interpreting this view as a holding}.
'" See Harvey, 278 F.3d at 385 (King,J., concurring) (finding that prisoner was not
denied access to B-rady material).
· .
1
~ Harvt!J, 285 F.3d at 317 (Luttig,J., concuning).
IS!

t!ltl
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implications of potentially favorable evidence whose actual meaning is
unknown because it has been lost, destroyed, or withheld. These cases
do not abandon the basic Brady rule, but tailor it to assure that the
search for truth is not abandoned in the face of uncertainty.
In United States v. Valenzuela-Bernat the government had deported
potential witnesses in a criminal case (passepgers in the defendant's
car) when the defendant was prosecuted for· criminal transportation
1311
of aliens.
The defense had no opportunity to investigate their po140
tential usefulness or to preseiVe their testimony for trial.
The government made what the Court characterized as a "good-faith determination that they possess[ed] no evidence favorable to the defendant
in a criminal prosecution,"•~• and argued that immediate deportation
was otherwise required by the immigration laws and necessitated by
jail overcrowding. 1 ~2 The defendant responded that by deporting eyewitnesses, the government had deprived him of access to evidence
·
with which to build a defense: ...,
The Court recognized that deportation deprived the defen~ant of
the most direct means of showing that he had actually been denied
relevant evidence, thus supporting "a rel;rx:ation of the specificity required in showing materiality," but the Court refused to relieve the
11
defendant entirely of this burden. • Observing that the deportation
was mandated by statute, the Court averred that "[n]o onus, in the
sense of 'hidirig out' or 'concealing' witnesses," attached to the government's actions'~" and held that due process required a balancing of
interests to determine whether governmentai interference with a defendant's right to access to material witnesses violated the principle
that "a criminal defendant ... be treated with 'that fundamental fairness essential to the very concept of justice."' 14~ To make out a due
process violation, the defendant was required to provide "some plausible explanation of the assistance he would have received from the

l:o'J
1.0
HI

142
14
'
I +I

145
146

458 u.s. 858,861 (1982).
!d.
/d. at 872.
/d. at 865.
/d. at 861.
!d. at 870.
/d. at 866.
/d. at 872 (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941 )).
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147

testimony of the deported witnesses" -a showing that Valenzuela18
Bernal failed to make. •
149
In Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, the defendant in a sexual abuse of a
minor prosecution sought disclosure of records maintained by the
state's Children and Youth Services agency (CYS) regarding the complainant, arguing that the file might contain exculpatory information
regarding witnesses to the incident and other potentially favorable
evidence. 1!'oll CYS asserted that the materials were confidential under a
state statute and withheld the file from both the prosecution and the
defense:r•t The Court,observed:
It is well settled that the government' has the obligation to turn over evidence in its possession that is both favorable to the accused and material
to guilt or puni~hment.... At thi11 stage, of course, it is impossible to say
1 2
whethc•· any information in the CYS records may be relevant .... ~

The Court ruled, therefore, that due process required in camera review of the file by the trial court to determine "whether it contain[ed]
information that probably would have changed the outcome of [the]
trial."'r.~ Thus, even without a particularized showing that evidence
would be favorable, ·and in the face of state-created privileges, due
process required production of the evidence to determine its import
154
for the guilt or innocence of the defendant.
Arizona v. Youngblood'!>' involved untested evidence that had been
destroyed by prosecutorial negligence. In a prosecution for child molestation, the police had seized the complainant's clothes and had

~ Jd.. at 871.
ld. at 872.
''*'
480 u.s. 39 (1987}.
l!'tll
ld. at 43-45.
1 1
~ lrl. at 43.
~~~ /d. at 57 (citations omitted).
1 3
~ !d. at 5B-59.
1
~ The Court ha'> overridden other privilege~ when a deFendant has (lemonstrated
that" fair trial requires disclosure <>f the witness or evidence protected by the privilege.
S11f!, P..g., United State.• v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713-16 (1974) {ordering production of
presidential document.'> over claim of executive privilege); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S.
308,315-20 (1974) {deciding juvenile records of prosecution's main witness must be
disclosed to detense to show bias Ol' molive); Roviaro v. United States, 353 U.S. 53, 6366 ( 1957) (finding informant's ptivilege trumped by due process right to evidence
from eyewitnesses to <~lleged criminal event); r.f. Chambers v. MiliSissippi, 410 U.S. 284,
302-0l~ (1973) {overriding a state rule that prevented the impeachment of a party's
own witness).
IM 488U.S.51 (1988).
1 7

148
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possession of a rape kit with semen samples.' They properly pre157
served the rape kit, but failed to refrigerate the clothing. The samples from the rape kit were initially analyzed only to determine
whether sexual contact had occurred, but no testing for blood group. was d one at th at ume.
.
l!i8
mg
Just before trial, the State's expert examined the clothes for the
159
first time and found semen staiits.
However, due to the lack of refrigeration, the evidence was degraded and the expert was unable to
11 1
obtain blood groupings or other identifying characteristics. w The
1111
swabs from the rape kit also tested negative for blood groupings.
The state court of appeals determined that proper preservation of the
evidence would have produced results that "might have completely
162
exonemted the defendant" and reversed the conviction. 111~ The Supreme Court first found that the State had complied with Brady by
providing to the defense all expert reports and evaluations of the
physical evidence as well as access to the evidence for testing by defense experts. 1M For our purposes, the Court's observation that "access to the swab and to the clothing" was part of the State's compliance with Brady'r"' is important, since it is access to material in the
current possession of the State that is at issue in the postconviction
DNA context.
The Court viewed Youngblood's claim to preservation of evidence
as implicating a "constitutional duty over and apart from that imposed
166
by ... Brady."
Emphasizing that "'[w]henever potentially exculpatory evidence is permanently lost, courts face the treacherous task of
divining the import of materials whose contents are unknown and,
167
very often, disputed, '" as well as the vast scope of the possible duty to
100

/d. at 53.

1~7

ld.

1!11!

/d.

1

~" /d. at 54.
1

!HI

/d.
fd.

l<if

State v. Youngblood, 734 P.2d 592, 597 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).

II;Q

ltl~ /d.
11

,.. Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 55; see also id. at 58 ("None of this information was concealed from respondent at trial, and the evidence-such as it was--was made a\oailable

to re~ondent's expert ....").
'" hl. at 55.
~ !d. at 56.
167
ld. at 57-58 (quoting California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479,487 (1984)). The
Court in Trombeua ruled that the Due Process Clause did not require the State to preserve breath samples in order to introduce breath-analysis results at trial. 467 U.S. at
11 1
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preserve all potentially significant material, the Court constrained the
scope of the State's obligation. While Brady did not tum on the "good
or bad faith of the State," 1118 the Court denied relief to Youngblood by
requiring a showing of bad faith by the State in failing to preserve evidence.11;o Due process is violated only when "the police themselves by
their conduct indicate that the evidence could form a basis for exon170
erating the defendant."
Youngblood and Ritchie leave little doubt concerning the State's obligation at the trial stage to provide untested DNA evidence that is potentially exculpatory to the defendant. From a constitutional perspective, there is no functional difference between denying access to
evidence in the prosecutor's possession and bad faith destruction of
that evidence; in both cases, evidence which "could form a basis for
exonerating the defendant" has been deliberately denied to the defendant. This, indeed, was the presupposition of Youngblood itself. 171

491. These samples were obtained and tested to determine the blood alcohol level of a
DUI suspect. lrl. at 482. The State's duty to preserve evidence was "limited to evidence
that might be expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense." /d. at 488.
With respect to breath sample testing, the "intoxily-ler" used by the State to measure
blood alcohol content was reviewed and certified for accuracy by the state department
of health, and any faulty operational factors could be raised at trial without regard to
testing of other samples. hl. at 489-90. Accordingly, the defendant failed to show either that the material possessed an exculpatory value or that he did not have alternative means of demonstrating unreliable results. ld. at 489. By contrast, in a case ·ad·
dressing postconviction DNA access,. the prosecutor has nfustd to test or disclose
evidence in her possession. Trombetta is entirely consistent with the application of
Brad~J>rindples to po5tconviction DNA access.
YmmgiJiood, 488 U.S. al 57.
tOO frl. <It 58.
rro /d. The Coun observed with unintentional irony: "In the present case, the
likelihood that the preserved materials would have enabled the defendant to exonerate himself appears to be greater than it was in Trombetta • ..• " Id. at 56. The subse·
quent developments in Mr. Youngblood's case were narrated by justice Feldman of the
Arizona Supreme Court:
Youngblood was found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, and his conviction
was ultimately upheld by this court on a 3-to-2 vote. Years later, advances in
science pennitted testing of what evidence remained. Those tests revealed
that Youngblood, who served some seven years in prison, was not the perpe·
trator. The convict.ions were vacated in 2000. Su Thomas Stauffer &: Jim
Erickson, DNA Test Clears Tucsonan ConvicUd in MolesttUion, [ARlz.] DAlLY STAR,
Aug. 9, 2000, at AI (county attorney usorry" that Youngblood was "incarcerated fol' an offense for which he was not guilty").
State v. Harrod, 26 P.3d 492, 505..06 (Ariz. 2001) (Feldman, J., concurring) (footnote
omitted).
171
As the Court stated:
There is no question but that the State complied with Brady and [United Stales
v. Agur.Y, 427 U.S. 97 ( 1976)) here. The State disclosed relevant police reports
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. Likewise, Ritchie makes clear that the proper response to arguments
about the indeterminate evidentiary value of evidence that the government withholds is to ascertain the real value of the evidence, without any reference to good faith or bad faith. Any potentially determinative DNA evidence seized and held by the police or prosecutor must
be made available for testing and use at trial.m Suggestions that DNA
need not be tested because "[i] t is not now known whether the biological evidence being sought by [the defendant] would be favorable
175
or unfavorable to him" and could have been denied at trial misread
Supreme Court precedent and exalt willful ignorance.
Moreover, given the extraordinary exculpatory qualities of DNA
evidence, police and prosecutors must adjust their procedures to
avoid destruction of this evidence.. As the Cou~t explained in Youngblood, the "presence or absence of bad faith ... must necessarily tum
on the police's knowledge of the exculpatory value of the evidence at
the time it was lost or destroyed." ~ In an era of universal use of DNA
evidence to both implicate and exonerate criminal suspects, it would
be disingenuous for the prosecutor to claim that anything short of a
truly accidentall~ss was not strong evidence of bad faith.
17

C. Postconviction Access

The strongest conceptual argument against applying disclosure
obligations to postconviction access rests on a construction of Brady
that limits its protections to the fact-finding process. In the typical
case seeking postconviction access, the trial has already occurred, and
du'e process requirements were observed at the time of the trial.
Thus, the argument goes, the State cannot be accused of unfairly ex--------------·-·--~------------------

to [the defendant], which contained information about the existence of the
swab and the clothing, and the boy's examination at the hospital. The State
provided ... the laboratory reports and notes prepared by the police criminologist, and respondent's expert had access to the swab and to the clothing.
Younflood. 488 U.S. at 55.
,
1
·
Sa Brewster v. Shasta County, No. 00-17105, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 27544, at
*10-12 (9th Cir. Dec. 28, 2001) (finding pretrial denial of access to DNA samples
would have been a constitutional violation). In BreriJslt!r, the allegation that the failure
to obtain tesu of potentially exculpatory samples was in bad faith was supported by the
allegation that the sheriff's department failed to infonn the laboratory of available evidence, or to return the laboratory's calls. /d. at *12; if. Young v. State, 746 N.E.2d 920,
923 (Ind. 2001) ("We think it is obvious that it would be an abuse of discretion to den)'
an impecunious defendant funding for a potentially exculpatory DNA test.").
17
Harveyv. Horan, 278 F.3d 370,385 n.6 (4th Cir. 2002) (King,J., concurring).
174
488 U.S. at 57 n.•.
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plaiting an informational advantage to obtain a conviction. A number
of courts have suggested that these differences are sufficient to free
the State from any postconviction constitutional obligations regarding
DNA evidence. m.
The disclosure right that lies at the core of the Brady doctrine,
however, implicates far more than a formally fair trial. First, the basis
of the Brady obligation, like much of the .. extratextual" criminal procedure adopted by the Supreme Court, is not the perfection of the
rules of a sporting contest, but.the achievement of justice. Brady imposed an obligation of disclosure because of a risk that, in the absence
of disclosure obligations, innocent defendants would be punished.
This risk persists in the postconviction setting. Brady is based on the
constitutionalizatio11 of a particu,ar role for the prosecution: it can.not be concerned only with convictions, and must take as its motto,
"The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens
in the courts." 11r. That proposition applies to postconviction proceedings, and an obsession with finality to the exclusion of justice is at
odds with the legitimate administration of punishment
Second, a State's decision to deny access to DNA eviqence. that
could demonstrate innocence must be judged against the substantive
due process standards of fundamental fairness and prohibitions on
arbitrary governmental conduct In cases like Godschalk and Smith,
denial of access to evide.nce serves no legitimate purpose sufficient to
save it from constitutional arbitrariness.

I. Constitutional Importance of Inno<;ence in Criminal Justice
The protection of innocence has been the touchstone of due process in the criminal justice system. The central and common ground
for declaring certain rights fundamental under the Due Process
Clause is the protection those rights provide against conviction of in175

E.g., Haroiry, 278 F.3d at 378-79 (rejecting prisoner's Brady claim since he "re·
ceived a fair trial and was given the opportunity to test the DNA evidence ... using the
best technology available at the time").
17
q Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (reciting the inscription on the wallll
of the U.S. Department of Justice); if. State v. Hammond, 604 A.2d 793, 806 (Conn.
1992) (noting that, if the prosecution umade a tactical choice not to have the ramples
tested prior to the verdict," then "[s]uch a tactical choice would plainly have been a
breach of the prosecutor's ethical duty to pursue relevant evidence even if it may be
exculpatory"); ABA, STANI>ARDS FOR CRIMINAL .JUSTICE PROSECUTION F'UNC110N AND
DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-S.ll (c) (3d ed. 1993) ("A prosecutor should not intentionally
avoid pursuit of evidence because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's
case or aid the accused.").
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nocent persons. 177 As the Court has declared in the last half century,
due process prohibits state and federal governments from criminally
punishing an individual without proving guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. 118 Despite the absence of an explici.t textual warrant for this
proposition in the Bill of Rights, the Court observed that "the re~on
able-doubt standard plays a vital role i~ the ~erican scheme of
criminal procedure."''l'il The Court continued:
[The) use of the reasonable-doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and confidence ~f the coml)lunity in applications of
the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not
be diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether
.
. con d emned . 180
.
•
mnocent
men are bemg

Nor is the issue merely one of the proper instructions for a finder of
fact, since constitutional due process requires that the evidence submitted actually support the guilt of the individuaJ, to be punished. For
instance:
The Winship doctrine requires more than simply a trial ritual. A doctrine
establishing so fundamental a substantive constitutional standard must
.als!J require that the factfinder will rationally apply that stand~rd to the
facts in evidence. A "reasonable doubt," at a minimum, is one based
upon "reason... vet a: properly instructed jury may occasionally co~vict
even when it can be said that no rational trier of fact could' find guilt bey~nd a reasonable doubt, and the same may be said of a: trial judge sitting as a jury. . . . Under Winship, which established proof beyond a reasonable doubt as an essential of J<ourteenth Amendment due process, it
follows that when such a conviction occurs in a state trial, it cannot con. .
IIy stan d . 1st
sutuuona

.

, '" Many of the Supreme Court's cnmmai due process cases arc bait:d on the historically recognized right to a reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence. See, e.g.,
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 110-14 (1977) (requiring the totality of the circumstances approach to the identification of witnesses); In n:Winship, 397 U.S. 358,362-64
(1970) (concerning the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt); United States v.
Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 22~38 (1967), (requiring prosecutors to use fair identification
procedures); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 338-41} (1963) (establishing the defendant's right to appointed counsel); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 106 (1935)
(establishing the prohibition against use of perjured testimony).
1711
See, e.g., Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-64 (discussing the necessity of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt in criminal cases).
179
!d. at 363.
180
!d. at 364; see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977) (MLong before
Winship, the universal rule in this country was that the prosecution must prove guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt").
181
Jackson"· Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316-18 ( 1979) (footnotes omitted).
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This principle is not merely an artifact of the Warren Court, nor is
it extinguished by the fact of a final criminal conviction affirmed by
state courts. Just last Term, in Fiare v. 'White, the Court unanimously
granted relief to a habeas petitioner who proved that no trial evidence
supported an element of the crime of which he was convicted, despite
82
the affirmance of his conviction by state appellate courts.' It reaffirmed that when proof beyond a reasonable doubt does not support
each element of a crime, as a matter of due process, the continued in183
carceration of the individual is unlawful.
To be sure, the standards demanded by due process apply differently once a defendant has been convicted. T~e Court has not resolved the question of whether a post-trial demonstration of factual
innocence beyond the trial record can be the basis for a habeas petition, but it has held that such a claim of actual innocence cannot impeach a criminal verdict in the absence of a "truly persuasive" demon181
stration of factual error.
It is precisely such a demonstration that
the denial of DNA evidence makes impossible.
The right to disclosure of favorable evidence emanates from correlative due process protections: by making available exculpatory evi11111

531

u.s. 225,228-29 (2001).

also Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 325 (1995) (noting that "concern
about the injustice that results from the conviction of an innocent person has long
been at the core of our criminal justice system" and crafting an exception to the procedural default rules to allow a habeas petition with an appropriate showing of actual
innocence when a petitioner is "alleging a fundamental miscarriage of justice" rather
than "alleging that his sentence is too severe").
tllol Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Herrera did not resolve the question of whether a post-trial demonstration of actual innocence renders criminal punishment unconstitutional. ChiefJustice Rehnquist's majority opinion assumed "for the
sake of argument" that a "truly persuasive" showing would have that effect; however. it
concluded that no such showing had been made. /d. In this proposition, he was
joined by separate concurring opinions by justice O'Connor, writing for herself and
Justice Kennedy, id. at 419-27 (O'Connor,j., concuning), and by Justice White, id. at
429 (White,j., concurring). The dissent by justice Blackmun,joined by Justices Stevens and Souter, would have held that a "truly persuasive demonstration of 'actual innocence"' would make execution of the petitioner unconstitutional, and remanded for
investigation of petitioner's claim un t11at standard. /d. at 441 (Blackmun, J., dissent·
ing). Only Justices S~;alia and Thomas would have found no due process concerns presented by newly discovered evidence of innocence. /d. at 428-29 (Scalia, J., concurring).
·
Fiurt!,likewise, did not resolve the question, since it was a clarification of the state's
interpretation of its law, rather than a supervening demonstration of fact, that led the
Court to overrule the Third Circuit. 531 U.S. at 228-29; see also St:lilup, 513 U.S. at 31516 (distinguishing the claim in Schlup from the claim in Herrera based primarily on the
fact that Schlup asserted a constitutional error at trial and was thus permitted to make
a lesser showing of innocence).

'"' /d.;

Slit!
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dence, disclosure setves to ensure that the innocent are not wrong185
fully punished. Brady and its progeny are premised on the principle
that suppression of material evidence poses a significant risk of punishing the innocent, and, when post-uial access to DNA evidence can
establish that this risk has become manifest, Brady's fundamental
principles are implicated.
As the Brady doctrine has evolved, the Court has imposed duties
previously thought to be incompatible with the adversarial system.
Prior to Brady not only was there no tradition or history of mandated
disclosure of favorable evidence, but discovery in criminal cases was
1111
severely resuicted in mostjurisdictions. ., The Court has relied upon
general principles of fairness, and rudimentary demands of justice,
and the specific goal of avoiding conviction and incarceration of the
innocent as the grounds for the disclosure mandate. As the Court
stated: "A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which ... would tend to exculpate him ... does not comport
187
with standards ofjustice .... "
Like the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the
Brady rule is not based upon any specific textual requirement of the
Constitution. Rather, it is grounded in the .broad concerns of fundamental fairness. In the pre-Brady period, the Court ruled that due
process prohibited the use of petjured testimony by the government;
such conduct was said to be "inconsistent with the ntdimentary demands of justice," and, hence, proscribed by a conception of due process that "embodies the fundamental conceptions of justice which lie
11111
at the base of our civil and political institutions. " So too, the Court
determined that a failure to correct inaccurate statements by a prosecution witness violated due process, observing that "[t]he principle
that a State may not knowingly use false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction, [is) implicit in any concept of
1811
ordered liberty." The disclosure obligation germinated in a period
defined by evolving standards of liberty and justice; the prosecutor's
1115

United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985) ("[The] purpose [of Brady] is
not to displace the advel'l!ary system as the primary means by which truth is uncovered,
but to ensure that a miscarriage ofjustice does not occur.").
tllll See supra text accompanying no~ 112 {describing the hyper-adverJarial state of
criminal law that existed before Brody); su also Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 317-18
(4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig, J., concurring) (rejecting the history of concealment in favor
offull disclosure of evidence that might prove innocence).
187
Brady v. Maryland, .!173 U.S. 83,87-88 (1963).
188
Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935).
189
Napue v.lllinpis, 360 U.S. 264,269 (1959).

..
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obligations· were tied directly to the protection against conviction and
incarceration of the innocent.
Brady itself was decided in the .. incorporation era" during which
specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights were made applicable to the
190
states under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
But Brady drew on an earlier, and less textually focused, methodology,
for none of the more· specific provisions of the Bill of Rights are directly implicated by the issue of disclosure of exculpatory material.
Brady's due process analysis rested upon concerns of the reliability of
the fact-finding process and the legitimate role of the governme~t in
exercising its police power. As the Court explored the obligations
that flowed from Brady and faced issues relating to the loss or destruction of potentially .e~culpatory evidence, "free-standing due process"
principles designed to assure the accurat~ imposition of criminal punishment continued to dominate its analysis. 1111 Professor Israel has
commented that "free-standing due process rulings might be characterized as 'narrow' in. that they tend to focus on the value of adjudicatory fairness (looking primarily to protect against the conviction of the
innocent), rather than on the broader range ofvalues reflected in the
whole of the specific guarantees. nl!l'l
The analysis that generated Brady-and the fundamental role of
innocence in the criminal justice system-extends to postconviction
proceedings. When the government possesses previously secured
DNA evidence that could demonstrate innocence, the principles of
fundamental fairness that coalesced to produce the Brady doctrine
maintain their force. just as the .constitutional status of the "re~on
able doubt". requirement forbids the continued incarceration of a
convicted defendant when it becomes clear after trial that the evidence against her fails to sustain the elements of a crime, ~ the State

..

100

19

'

See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968) (incorporating the
Sixth Amendment's guarantee of trial by jury); Malloy. v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 3 (1964)
(finding that the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees defendants the protection of the
Fifth Amendment's privilege .against self-incrimination in state courts); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-45 (1963) (incorporating the Sixth Amendment's guar·
antee of the right to counsel).
1 1
~ See Jerold H. lsra~l, Free-Standing Due Process and Criminal Procedun: Tilt. SufJrrnl#.
Court:S Search for Interpretive Guidelines, 45 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 303, 383 (2001) (discussing
the development offundamental fairness in the post-incorporation era).
192
Jd. at 397-98 (footnote omitted). ·
13
"
See Fiore v. White, 531 ·u.s. 225, 228-29 (2001) ·(holding that the defendant
could not continue to be incarcerated when the prosecution failed to prove an element of the crime).
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should not be free to deny post-trial access to evidence that can definitively negate guilt.
;:
To be sure, as Justice White observed in Patterson v. New York:
Due process does not require that every conceivable step be taken, at
whatever cost, to eliminate the possibility of convicting an innocent person. Punishment of those found guilty by a jury, for example, is not forbidden merely ·because there is a remote possibility in some instances
191
that an innocent person might go to jail.
•
•
•

..

It is only the failure to provide the constitutional 'minima necessary to
assure "fundamental fairness" that offends the Constitution.
The proper mode of analysis for "fundamental fairness" in criminal due process has be~n a matter of some disagreement on the
Court. ~ Given the fact' that Brady "require[s] States to institute procedures· that were neither required at common law rior explicitly
196
command-ed by the text of the Constitution," it would seem that a
narrow. historical analysis is simply inapposite 'to determining the
scope of the Brady obligations. Indeed, in examining the reach of
19

4.32 u.s. 197,208 (1977).
' '
For example, in Medina v. Califomia, 505 U.S. 437, 445-47 (1992),Justice Ken·
nedy's majority opinio'n rejected the balancing test of MatheWs v. Eldri~. 424 U.S. 319,
334-35 (1976), as a template for determining "fundamental fairness" for purposes of
criminal procedure. Instead, it adopted an analysis that looked first to historical practice and then to "'fundamental fairness' in operation." MedinfJ. 505 U.S. at 448 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) ). J~tices O'Connor and Souter
concurred in lhe judgment, but argued lhat the wbalancing of equities is inappropriate
in evaluating whelher state criminal procedures amount to due process." ld. at 453
(O'Connor,)., concurring).
In Montana v. Egelhoff, Justice Scalia, writing for four Justices, took lhe position
that wroJur primary guide in determining whether the prinCiple in question is funda~
mental is ... historical practice." 518 U.S. 37, 43 (1996). By contrast, Justice
O'Connor, writing for four Justices in dissent, maintained that proper analysis '"requires that the competing intere.s.ts be closely examined."' ld. at 67 (O'Connor,]., dissenting) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973)). Justice Souter
focused on whelher'thechallenged practice was wrational.in today's world." Id. at 7475 (Souter,]., dis~enting):
In Cooper v. Oklahoma, a unanimous Court looked to bolh historical practice and
"whether the rule exhibit[ed] 'fundamental fairness' in operation" in invalidating a
procedural system lhat ~impose{d) a significant risk of an erroneous determination"
when ~injury to lhe State ... [was] modest." 517 U.S. 348,362-65 (1996).
Judge Luttig has suggested that lhe balancing test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge
provides wthe proper analytical framework for determining whether there exists a procedural due process right to (DNA] a~cess," because the asserted right does not challenge a conviction. Harvey Horan, 285 F.Sd 298, 315 n.6 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,j.,
concurring).
196
Medina, 505 U.S. at 454 (O'Conrior,J., concurring).
l9'1
195

v,
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Brady in United States v. Ruiz.,m Justice Breyer, writing for eight justices,
made no mention of history. Instead, he engaged in a balancing of
interests, including the importance of avoiding the conviction and incarceration of innocent individuals, the value of the proposed additional safeguards, and the adverse impact of the proposed obligations
on governmental interests. 198 Determining whether "fundamental
fairness" demands access to DNA evidence thus requires an evaluation
of both the degree of protection access provides against punishment
of the innocent and the burden such protection casts on the State.
Where the State gains exclusive access to evidence that can demonstrate innocence, the concerns of "fundamental fairness" militate
1119
strongly in favor of releasing that evidence.
The marriage of new
and uniquely powerful exonerating forensic science to the historic
fundamental due process guarantees against conviction of the innocent commands disclosure at any point in the continuum of the
criminal process. There can be no exaggerating the unique and unprecedented power of DNA forensic science to determine guilt or innocence in serious criminal cases. Eyewitness testimony, confessions
or other admissions of guilt, and other forms of direct and circumstantial evidence of guilt or innocence present issues of credibility that
turn largely on subjective evaluations as to perception, memory, articulation, bias, motive, and self-interest. Forensics have provided
strong evidence in certain areas (e.g., blood alcohol tests for DUI and
radar for speeding cases), but this evidence ·often concerns comparatively minor charges, and even with this evidence, there is rarc:!ly proof
of guilt or innocence beyond all doubt. 200 The analysis we have set
forth would apply as well 'to equally compelling and determinative

122 S. Ct. 2450 (2002).
ltl. at 245&-57. In setting forth the standard of analysis in Ruiz., the Court relied
on Akev. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). Rui1., 122 S. Ct. at 2456. In Ake, the Court applied a Mathews analysis to a question of criminal procedure. 470 U.S. at 77.
199
The Court has applied due process or equality principles to avoid fundamental
unfairnel!s in a variety or contexts. See, ~.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 56-62 (1987)
·(concluding that per se exclusion of defendant's hypnotically refreshed testimony violated defendant's right to testify on her own behalf); Webb v. TeKas, 409 U.S. 95, 97-98
(1972) (holding that the defendant was denied due process when a defense witness
decided not to testify following the trial judge's threat of a perjury prosecution); Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22-23 (1967) (finding unconstitutional a state statute that
rendered accomplices incompetent to testify for one another, though competent to
testi~for the State).
.
Cf. United States ex ul. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820 (3d Cir. 1952}
(holding that it violated the defendant's due process rights for the prosecution to suppress physical evidence that could have determinatively exonerated him).
t\71

198
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evidence, whether currently existing or of a new technology not yet
developed. However, it is important to note the limitation we would
impose: the evidence would have to be comparable to DNA in its exculpatory power.
Recent disclosures in cases in which DNA evidence has exonerated persons on death row or serving long prison sentences demonstrate that the evolving technology can hold the key to justice for the
201
convicted innocent.
In scores of cases where convictions appeared
to be based on solid, and in some circumstances overwhelming, evi·
dence, DNA evidence has proven actual innocence. By the same token, DNA evidence now serves as a critical and essential filter in the
investigative phase of criminal proceedings. Thus, it is difficult to
imagine a case today that would result in charges being pressed when
DNA evidence excludes the suspect (even in the face of otherwise
compelling evidence of guilt); conversely, where DNA demonstrates
that the suspect was the perpetrator, even with no other evidence, the
prospects for conviction are virtually ensured.202 No other evidence
known to the criminal justice system has this broadly applicable and
uniquely dispositive power. ~ Providing access to such evidence im20

:mt See DWYER, NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 20, at 246 (describing the types of
cases where innocent people were wrongly convicted and later exonerated). Since
DNA evidence has been routinely used in the investigative process of criminal cases, it
has resulted in the clearance of prime suspects in twenty-five percent of cases. Peter
Neufeld & Barry C. Scheck, Foreword to CONNORS ET AL., supra note 27, at xxviii, x.xviii;
St!8 also DeueiDpmmls in the Law-O:mfrunting the New ChoJien~s of Scientific Evidence, supra
note 133, at 1577-78 (noting that even if a defendant has been found innocent
through DNA evidence, she may still face difficulties achieving her freedom); cJ. supra
note 47 (recounting the use of DNA evidence to identify World Trade C-enter victims).
llll'l See Marjory Fisher, Procedural issues Surrounding Post-Conviction DNA Ttsling. 35
NEW ENG. L REv. 621, 622 {2001) (explaining that prosecutors use DNA to inculpate
and exonerate defendants). Indeed, DNA evidence is so reliable that some states permit "John Doe" indictments when DNA evidence exists but no suspect has been identified. See Meredith A. Bieber, Comment, Meeting the Statute or Beating It: Using john
Doe" lndktmtm/.s Based on DNA to Meet the Statute of Limitations, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1079,
1083 (2002) (noting DNA-based indictments without a suspect in New York, Wiscon·
sin, and New Mexico).
.
~~ In some jurisdictions, the right to access DNA ·postconviction is based on an
analysis of the "strength" of the State's case at trial. Thus, in some cases, it is only when
the State relied on disputed eyewitness testimony as opposed to a confession of the de·
fendant that DNA testing has been ordered. See Commonwealth v. Godschalk, 679
A.2d 1295, 1297 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996) (finding that DNA evidence was not required
because the defendant's conviction was based primarily on his "confession"); Commonwealth v. Brison, 618 A.2d 420, 425 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that principles
ofjustice required the case to be remanded for DNA testing, given that the State's only
evidence was an eyewitness account). But given the dispositive "strength" of DNA evi·
dence, this approach is seriously flawed. Indeed, twenty-four percent of DNA exonera·
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poses no burden on legitimate state interests. Where DNA demonstrates innocence, a central reason for respecting finality of criminal
judgments-that retrying a case years later will yield no objectively
sounder result than the initial trial-is not implicated. Where new
evidence is secured, whether it be direct evidence of innocence or
impeachment of the State's case at trial, there is usua11y no certainty of
its exculpatory value. Witnesses may change stories for truthful or invidious reasons, and attacks mounted years after trial on the integrity
of witnesses or other evidence may raise doubts but not prove innocence. DNA, by contrast, can demonstrate innocence; as we discuss
below, it does so without trespassing on any other interest that sup204
ports finality ofjudgments.
Brady v. Maryland and its progeny rest on the premise that the
prosecutor as a representative of the government is obligated to see
that justice is done. As the Court stated:
Society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal
trials are fair; our system ofthe administration ofjustice suffers when any
accused is treated unfairly. An inscription on the walls of the Department of justice states the proposition candidly for the federal domain:
~The United States wins its point whenever justice is done its citizens in
the courts." A prosecution that withholds evidence on demand of an accused which, if made available, would tend to exculpate him or reduce
200
the penalty ... does not comport with standards ofjustice ....

The obligations that the Court imposed ensure that the prosecutor is
"the 'servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not
escape or innocence suffer. ,,wn While these commitments were enun-

tions involve "confessions." S# DWYER. NEUFELD &: SCHECK, sufrra note 20, at 246
(breaking down the reasons for the wrongful convictions of those exonerated through
DNA testing). Once DNA excludes a defendant, no matter how strong the case appeared at trial, we know to a moral certainty that the defendant is innocenL
2fM See infra Part IV (arguing that DNA disclosure neither practically nor theoreti·
cally interferes with the State's interest in finality).
105
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83,87-88 (1963); su also Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S.
66, 100 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring) ("A criminal trial is not a game in which the
s.tat.e's function is to outwit and entrap its quarry. The State's pursuit is justice, not a
>1Ctlm. ).

~~~~ United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 111 (1976) (quoting Berger v. United
States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1985) ); see Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 268, 281 (1999) (explaining that the special role of the prosecutor, as '"the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest .•. [is] that justice shall be done;w is the reason behind requiring prosecutorial disclosure (quoting Bergtr. 295 U.S. at 88)); United States v.
Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 n.6 (1985) ("By requiring the prosecutor to assist the defense
in making its case, the Brady rule represents a limited departure from a pure adversary
model.~); see also Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 439 ( 1995) (concluding that disclosure
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dated in the context of trial proceedings, there is no reason to believe
that they evaporate upon conclusion of trial. It would be inconsistent
with the constitutionally mandated role of the prosecutor to offer fabricated evidence on appeal or in postconviction proceedings. It is no
less an abdication of the obligation to ensure "that justice shall be
done" for a prosecutor to seek to maintain the effect of a verdict she
has won by denying access to evidence that could show such a verdict
207
to be urtjust. And, as we will see, it is primarily a claimed interest in
"finality" that· undergirds the opposition to postconviction DNA testing.
2. Constitutional Arbitrariness and Due Process

a

General due process principles provide second basis for preventing prosecutors from denying post-trial access to potentially exculpatory DNA By refusing access to DNA samples in cases like Godschalk
and Smith. prosecutors make it impossible for prisoners to prove their
innocence in any venue. The government thereby imposes a postconviction risk that innocent prisorters will conpnue to suffer confinement. Several courts have recognized that this imposition of risk violates the minimal demands of the Due Process Clause. 208

on the part of the prosecutor serves "to justify trust in the prosecutor as 'the representative ... of a sovereignty ... whose interest ... in a crimir!'al prosecution is not that it
shall win a case, but that justice shall be done'" (quoting' Berger, 295 U.S. at 88)).
7
w See State v. Thomas, 586 A.2d 250, 252 (NJ. Super. CLApp. Div. 1991) ("[W]e
can conceive of no greater injustice, when that evidence is available, of depriving a
convicted defendant ofaccess to it. The prosecutor, the court, and the judicial system
have an obligation to protect the innocent which is no less fundamental than the obligation ... to punish the guilty."); Sewell v. State, 592 N.E.2d 705, 707 (Ind. CL App.
1992) (concluding that Brady can require disclosure of evidence that v.-as not available
at the time of the defendant's trial for DNA comparison, stating that there would be
"'no greater injustice'" than depriving a convicted defendant of access to available evidence (quoting Th0711QS, 586 A.2d at 252) ). The court in State v. Hammond admonished
the prosecution for possibly not testing DNA material prior to the verdict. 604 A.2d
793,806 (Conn. 1992). According to the court:
Such a tactical choice would plainly have been a breach of the prosecutor's
ethical duty to pursue relevant evidence even if it may be exculpatory. "It is
unprofessional conduct for a prosecutor intentionally to avoid pursuit of evi·
dence because he or she believes it will damage the prosecution's case or aid
the accused.~
!d. (~oting] ABA, STANDARDS FOR CRJMINALjUSTICE § 3-3.11 (c) (2d ed. 1980) ).
See, e.g., Lambert v. State,l999-CA.00395-SCT,1 21 (Miss. 2001), 777 So. 2d 45,
49 ("[W]e cannot say with definite and finn conviction that a mistake has not been
made. The least we can do now is allow [the defendant] to apply modem science to
the evidence used against him."); State v. Velez, 746 A.2d 1073, 1078 (NJ. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 2000) ("We recognize the importance of finality. However, the objective of
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The Supreme Court has not ruled definitively on the disconcerting question of whether a State violates the minimal demands of due
process when it continues to punish a convicted prisoner who can
conclusively demonstrate factual innocence. In Herrera v. Collins, a
death row inmate sought to present newly discovered evidence in federal postconviction proceedings that he claimed exonerated him of
200
the murders for which he faced execution.
Writing for three Justices in dissent who would have entertained the claim, Justice Blackmun viewed the question as whether it was contrary to "contemporary
standards of decency" to "execute a person who is actually innocent."21(1 The dissenters would have ruled that under the Eighth
Amendment the "legitimacy of punishment is inextricably intertwined
with guilt" 211 and that the execution of an innocent person is an "arbitrary imposition" that would violate the demands of substantive due
21%
process.
The balance of the Court rejected this characterization. The majority acknowledged the importance of factual guilt for criminal punishment.m But according to the m~ority, "petitioner [did] not come

the criminal justice system is the fair conviction of the guilty and the protection of the
innocent. The system fails if an innocent person is convicted."); Thomas, 586 A.2d at
254 ("We would rather tear at [the] roots [of the defense bar's trial responsibility] ...
than sit by while an innocent man ... 'languishes in prison while the true offender
stalks his next victim."' (quoting id. at 255 (Baime,J., dis.<;enting)));jenner v. Dooley,
1999 SO 20, t 19,590 N.W.2d 463, 471-72 (stating that ~when newly developed scientific procedures can establish innocence[,] ... elementary fairness may compel the
new testing" and that prisoners are entitled to testing when such evidence "'would most
likely produce an acquittal in a new trial" and costs are not "exorbitant"); Julian v.
State, 966 P.2d 249, 254 (Utah 1998) (rejecting a restrictive interpretation of a state
postconviction Statute and Stating: uu· a Statute of limitations alone COUld be appJ.ied to
dismiss such a petition, a person who has spent years in prison who could show his innocence-e.g., by new DNA evidence ... could never be exonerated and obtain freedom from wrongful incarceration."). AJso, as the coun noted in Grinol.s v. State:
[A) defendant who obtained clear genetic evidence of their (sic] innocence
would be barred from presenting this evidence to the courts if the defendant
had already sought post-conviction relief on any other ground. In such cir·
cumstances, we believe that the Alaska Constitution's guarantee of due process of law would require the courts to hear the defendant's petition even
though the Statute seemingly prohibits it.
10 P.3d 600, 617 (A1ask.'l Ct. App. 2000).
20!1 506 u.s. 390, 393, 397 ( 1993).
:tlo tel. at 430 (Biackmun,j., dissenting).
211
fd. at 434 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
212
Jd. at 437 (Biackmun,J., dissenting).
m See id. at 404 (asserting that federal habeas jurisprudence does not cast wa blind
eye toward innocence"); see also id. at 419 (O'Connor,J., concurring) ("[E]xecut.ion of
a legally and factually innocent person would be a constitutionally intolerable event.").
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before this Court as an innocent man, but rather as one who has been
214
convicted by due process of law of two capital murders."
In this
view, the issue was the procedural one of whether, at the instance of
postconviction review, a federal court must entertain the claim that
could once again convert the petitioner into one who is "innocent in
215
the eyes of the law."
The majority assumed "for the sake of argument in deciding [the] case, that in a capital :case a truly persuasive
demonstration of 'actual innocence' made after trial would render the
execution of a defendant unconstitutional," and went on to assume
that this showing would "warrant federal habeas relief if there were no
. . ,216
state avenue open to process sueh a c1a1m.
Herrera harbors deep philosophical issues. 217 The majority's approach rests on assumptions about the fallibility of the search for
Justice Scalia, in a concurrence joined by Justice Thomas, took the position that the
absence of support for postconviction reviews of innocence in constitutional text or
historical practice meant that there was no constitutional bar to the execution of any
person claiming actual innocence after conviction. See id. at 427-28 (Scalia,J., concurring) ("There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that
were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration
of newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction.").
4
tl /d. at 407 n.6.
71
~ '/d. at 419 (O'Connor,]., concurring) (characterizing the majority's position).
tl& /d. at 417. Justice O'Connor, writing for herself and Justice Kennedy in concurrence, took the position that Mexecution of a legally and factually innocent person
would be a constitutionally intolerable event," id. at 419, but left open the question of
the availability of habeas re.lief, since the defendant had not made the ~extraordinarily
high" and ~truly persuasive" demonstration of innocence that would be the minimum
necessary to trigger such relief on any theory, id. at 426-27: Similarly, Justice White's
concurrence "assume[d) that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after
trial, even though made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence, would render unconstitutional the execution of
petitioner in this case." /d. at 429.
In Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 313-17 (1995), Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, emphasized that Herrera established a minimum evidentiary standard for bare innocence claims, but only accepted their constitutional viability arguendo, leaving the substantive question open. The Court denied
relief, however, because no Mtruly persuasive" demonstration was forthcoming. /d. at
312.
217
The m;Uority's approach to the question of innocence in Herrera sometimes
reads as if it subscribes to postmodern concepts of soda1ly constructed reality. In fact,
the approach mirrors the analysis advanced by Professor Bator in 1963, grounded on
the positivist epistemology of Karl Popper. See Paul M. Bator, Finality in Oriminal Law
and Federal Habeas Cmpusfor Slate Prisfmm, 76 HARV. L. REV. 441. 44649 (1963) (denying that the goal of post-trial criminal procedure can be to determine whether facts as
found are Mreally" true and the Jaw "really" correctly applied); id. at 448 n.12 (relying
on Karl Popper for the proposition that the suggested approach assumes the existence
of truth, but asserts fallibility in perceiving it}. Our own presuppositions are resolutely
pre-postmodem; we write under the assumption that the identity of the perpetrator of
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truth: an individual may be innocent in some ultimate sense of committing the act for which she has been charged, yet not "innocent in
the eyes of the law" because the "truth" that has emerged from her
trial holds her to be guilty. We as a society must live with that result in
the absence of epistemologically privileged access to past reality. The
driving moral force of the Herrera opinion comes from the concern
that "there is no guarantee that the guilt or innocence determination
would be any more exact" in a second trial, and as between first and
second trials, "the passage of time only diminishes the reliability of
criminal adjudications."~~~ The majority's arguendo exception for
"truly persuasive" showings of innocence responds to this concern. In
this regard, the capacity to analyze DNA evidence-a capacity that did
not exist at the time of the Herrera decision--can be dispositive, for it
would stretch legal'fiction beyond the breaking point to characterize a
prisoner as scientifically innocent, but not "innocent in the eyes of the
law."
The years since Herrera have also strengthened the legal theories
of the dissenters. Shortly before Herrera, Justices Scalia and Rehnquist
contended that the Ei.ghth Amendment contained no proportionality
principle requiring that punishment be· related to culpable guilt.~
and Justices Kennedy, O'Connor, and Souter emphasized the "narrowness" of Eighth Amendment proportionality review in upholding a
220
life sentence for possession of 650 grams of cocaine.
In the intervening decade, the Court has been willing to invalidate punishments
on the basis of independent judicial determinations that the punishments were 'gr~ssly disproportional to the gravity of ... defen221
dant[s'] offense(s]. "' Where it can be scientifically proven that the
19

a crime is a "realM fact, and that continuing to punish an individual on the ground that
she is the perpeU<~Ior when that proposition is scientifically false is "really" unjtL~t.
These presuppositions undergird much of the jurisprudence of modem criminal procedure. Our approach is· compatible with Popperian epistemology: we need claim
only that DNA exonerations are a more reliable guide to truth than a jury verdict or a
guihitflea.
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 403.
..
219
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 975-84 (1991) (Scalia, J.. joined by
Rehnouist, CJ.).
.
:rl<r
/d. at996-1001 (Kennedy,J., concurring).
Cooper Indus., Inc. v. LeaLhennan Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424,434 (2001)
(alterations&: omission in 'original) (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321.
334 ( 1998)); see alfo Atkins v. Virginia, 122 S. Ct. 2242, 2246 (2002) (invalidating the
imposition of capital punishment on a mentally retarded defendant, holding '"that it is
a precept ofjustice that puni11hment for crime should be graduated and proportioned
to the offense' [and) [w)e have repeatedly applied this proportionality precept in later
cases interpreting the Eighth Amendment.~ (quoting Weems v. United States, 217 U.S.
~I
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defendant has committed no crime, his continued incarceration can2
not be anything but "disproportional" to his offense. n
So, too, the Court has reiterated the importance and viability of
"substantive due process" limits on arbitrary governmental conduct
that "shock[s] the conscience of the court."22s While Justice Scalia's
concurrence in Herrera disdained an appeal to the conscience of the
courtn•-a position consistent with. his general distrust of substantive
due process analysis--six members of the Court, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis, reaffirmed the importance of substantively safeguard225
ing against arbitrary uses of governmental power. These safeguards
are directly implicated by arbitrary denial of access to DNA evidence.
Finally, Judge Luttig has expressed the view that one who has been
convicted retains "a protected liberty interest in his core right to freedom from bodily re~traint . . . [and] a protected liberty interest to
pursue his freedom from c~nfinement, though obviously after convic349,367 (1910))); Hanntlin, 501 U.S. at 1001 (Kennedy,]., concurring) (discussing the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition against grossly disproportionate sentences); Solem v.
Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 284 (1983) (stating that the Eighth Amendment prohibits not
only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are disproportionate to the crime
committed), overruled IJy Harmel.in, 501 U.S. at 965; Robinson v. California, 370 U.S.
660, 667 (1962) (holding that even though a ninetj-day prison term was neither cruel
nor unusual in the abstract, the facts in that case rendered the sentence violative of the
Eighth Amendment).
.
We may learn more on this topic when the Court addresses the question of proportionality (with respect to California's "Three Strikes" law) in its review of Andrade v.
Attorney Gtmera~ 270 F.3d 743 (9th Cir. 2001), c'ert. granted sub nom. Lockyer·v. Andrade,
122 S. Ct. 1434 (2002).
:m For a prisoner who is entirely without guilt, no punishment could be constitu·
tional. S,.e Atkins, 122 S. Ct. at 2247 ('"Even one day in prison would be a cruel and
unusual punishment for the "crime• of having a common cold."' (quoting Robinson,
370 U.S. at 667)).
m United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 746 (1987).
illl4
Herrera, 506 U.S. at 428.
22
~ See 523 U.S. 833, 847 n.8 (1998) (rejecting Justice Scalia's position in Herrera).
Lewis e~tablished a high burden of proof-intent to barm-in ca.c•es where police are
acting in situations (a high speed chase in /AUi.f) that give them little time to deliher·
ate. One of the authors has previously argued that the constellation of opinions in
Washington v. Glucluberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997), indicates a growing consensus within the
Court that arbitrary interferences with bodily liberty are subject to substantive due process review, set! Seth F. Kreimer, The Second Time as Tragedy: The Assisted Suicitbt Cases and
tl~ Heritage of Roe v. Wade, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 863, 866 (1997) (analyzing the
status of substantive due process in the Court), and that invalidation of violations of
minimal moral norms plays a legitimate and increasingly large role in our constitutional jurisprudence, see Seth F. Kreimer, Expluring tlur Dark Matter ofjudicial Revieru: A
Constitulionnl Census of the 1990s, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 427, 510-19 (1997) (dis·
cussing the essential moral norms that necessarily limit the exercise of governmental
powers).
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tion these interests are residual and considerably reduced."2'lf> When
227
the State provides-as all states do -a legal entitlemf:nt to postconviction relief upon a specified factual showing, it establishes a positive
law liberty interest that grounds due process constraints on the grant
or denial of reliee2A While the due process obligations are not identical to those that attach at the initial trial, the State may not dispose of
the prisoner's interests in a constitutionally arbitrary fashion.
In Herrera, the Court observed that even when postconviction judicial review is unavailable, "[e]xecutive clemency has provided the
'fail safe' in our criminal justice system. ,2'.l!l Denial of access to evidence that makes possible this "fail safe" remedy can constitute a deprivation of an important liberty interest. Though the matter is not entirely free from doubt, in its most recent examination of the scope of
the clemency interest in Ohio Adult Parole Authurity v. Woodard, 2llll five
Justices joined in the proposition that due process constrains the denial of parole.
When a person has been fairly convicted and sentenced, his liberty interest, in being free from such confinement, has been extinguished. But
iL is incorrect ... to say that a prisoner has been deprived of all interest .... Thus, although it is tme that "pardon and commutation decisions have not traditionally been the business of com't'>w ... some minimal procedural safeguards apply to clemency proceedings. Judicial
intervention might, for example, be warranted in the face of a scheme
whereby a srate official flipped a coin to detennine whether to grant

~ Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 313 (4th Cir. 2002) (Luttig,J., concurring).
·~'''
.. See Lackawctnna County Dist. Attorney v. Coss, 532 U.S. 394,. 402 (2001)
(" [E] ach State ha.~ created mechanisms for both direct appeal and state postconviction
review .... " (citing LARRVYACKL£, POSTCONVICI'ION REMEDIES§§ 1, 13 (1981 ed. &
Supp.2000))).
TlM See Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 387-88 (1985) (holding that, even though not
constitutionally required, when a State provides for appellate review of a Climinal conviction, it musl, under federal due process principles, accord all defendants the process guaranteed by the Constitution); Hicks v. Oklahoma, 447 U.S. 343, 346 (1980) (deciding r.haL state laws guaranteeing a defendant procedural rights at sentencing may
create a liberty interest protected by r.he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenr.h
Amendment against arbitrary deprivation); Vansickel v. White, 166 F.3d 953, 957 (9th
Cir. 1999) (stating that r.he right to peremptory challenges is a state-created liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment); Burkett v. Love, 89 F.3d 135, 139 (3d
Cir. 1996) (asserting that the arbitrary denial of parole is a substantive due process violation).
22!' 506 U.S. at 415 (quo~ng KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: jUSTICE, MERCY,
AND THE PUBLIC ll'\'TEREST 131 (1989)).
2 11
~ 523 u.s. 272 (1998).
211
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clemency, or in a case where the State arbitrarily denied a prisoner any
. cIemency process. 2"
access to tts

These precedents converge on the proposition that the State may
not arbitrarily deny access to DNA evidence that could free an innocent prisoner. At their core, the constitutional protections of life and
liberty prevent the State from consciously and without justification
harming innocent individuals.~'' It would, presumably, provoke no
gr~at disagreement to find that a State that continued to incarcerate a
convicted defendant after performing a determinatively exculpatory
DNA test would violate the Constitution.2.'1! But in cases like Godscha/Jr.
and Smith, s~nce no test had been performed, there is no deliberate
imprisonment of the innocent, and the question of what actions short
of such deliberately wrongful deprivations violate due process is less
clearly determined by precedent.
As we have discussed, the Supreme Court has recently advised that
"the touchstone of due process is protection ... against arbitrary action of government, " ~ "the exercise of power without any reasonable
justification,"m or "egregious" and "abusive executive action" that
236
"shocks the conscience." "[N]egligently inflicted harm," by contrast,
2 4

m /d. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring, joined by Souter, Ginsburg, & Breyer,jJ.)
(quoting Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981)). justice Stev·
ens adopted a similar position. See id. at 291 (Stevens,j., dissenting in part) (arguing
that fundamental fairness constrains the exercise of pardon power and stating that "deliberate fabrication of false evidenceft in a clemency proceeding would violate due process). Chief Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion (with Justices Scalia, Thomas, and
Kennedy) would have placed clemency proceedings wholly beyond the reach of due
process constraints. ld. at 279.
2
'~ E.g.. Hope v. Pelzer, 122 S. Ct. 2508, 2514 (2002) (examining the cruel and
unusual punishment inflicted on petitioner by handcuffing him to a hitching post);
County of Sacramentn v. Lewi~. 523 U.S. R33, 854 ( 1998) (discussing the implication~
of a high speed police chase on the decedent's Fourteenth Amendment rights).
m CJ. Kennell v. Gates, 215 F.3d 825, 826 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding that continued
detention after being informed that prisoner's fingerprints did not match those of the
suspect violated due process); Summerville v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (Conn.
1994) ("Even the strong interest in the finality of judgments and the state's interest in
retrying a defendant with reasonably fresh evidence does not require the continued
imprisonment of one who is actually innocent."); People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d
1330, 1335 (Ill. 1996) (arguing that as a matter of state constitutional law,
"[i]mprisonment of the innocent would also be so conscience shocking as to trigger
operation of substantive due processM).
2
'~ Lewis, 523 U.S. at 845.
m !d. at846.
236
ld.; see id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("(H]istory and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry."); Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 331 (1986) ("The Doctrine of Due Process ... was '"intended to secure the individual from the arbitrary exercise of the pow-
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"is categorically beneath the threshold of constitutional due process. ,:m In Lewis, the Court defined constitutional arbitrariness as an
"exercise of power without any reasonable justification in the service
238
of a legitimate governmental objective. ''
The· denial ·of access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence in
the government's custody is not an act of negligence; Godschalk and
Smith were faced with a deliberate and unilateral prosecutorial decision that assured their continued incarceration. Under Supreme
Court precedent, therefore, the question of whether that decision
rises (or sinks) to the level of arbitrariness that "shocks the conscience
of the court" turns on the degree to which the State can claim "rea~
sonable justification in the service of a legitimate governmental objective."m
The Court has had relatively few opportunities to address the
question of the continual confinement of persons who present verifiable claims of innocence, for most government officials acting in good
faith are not so callous as to imprison the innocent out of deliberate
indifference. One of those few opportunities arose in Baker v. McCollan, where the Dallas Police Department refused for three days to examine its files to determine the validity of the arrestee's claim that he
was not the person named in a valid arrest warrant. ~ In fact, the individual incarcerated was not the person named in the warrant, but
the Court held that the detention for three days over a New Year's
weekend did not rise to the level of a due process violation. 241 The
Court did, however, acknowledge:
2 0

[O)epending on what procedures the State affords defendants following
arrest and prior to actual trial, mere detention pursuant to a valid warrant but in the face of repeated protests of innocence will after the lapse
of a certain amount of time deprive the accused of "liberty ... without
2~~
due process of law."

ers of government."'" (quoting Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516,527 (1884) (quoting Hank of Columbia v. Okely, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 235, 244 (1819)))).
7
¥! Lewis, 523 U.S. at 849.
i!ll! Jd. at 846.
/d.
~.w 4.43 u.s. 137, 141 (1979).
41
~ Id. at 145-47.
2
·~ Id. at 145 (omission in original); see also id. at 148 (Biackmun, J., concurring)
(suggesting that "a sheriff who deliberately and repeatedly refused to check the identity of a complaining prisoner against readily available mug shots and fingerprints" has
engaged in an actionable due process violation).
:r.l9
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Lower courts have regularly held that extended and deliberate refusal
to examine easily available material that would lead to a prisoner's re. 1ates d ue process.245
Iease VJO
In one dimension, the actions of custodians of DNA evidence in
the cases at 'issue are less culpable than those of pretrial custodians in
this line of cases, for prosecutors rely not simply on an initial arrest
warrant, but on a judgment of conviction by which guilt was adjudicated beyond a reasonable doubt. But in another dimension, their actions are significantly more culpable. Unlike the prison custodian
who simply declines to check her files, the prosecutor who refuses to
release DNA for testing makes it impossible for the defendant to
prove innocence in any alternative fashion. Absent countervailing
state interests, such an action is at odds with the minimum standards
of fairness that condition the exercise of the state's police power. As
Judge Luttig stated:
[E]xcepting those justices peculiarly inured [to] what can be the ways of
bureaucracy, that it could indeed be thought shockingly arbitrary that
the government would literally dispose of the evidence used to deny one
of his liberty (if not his right to life) before it would turn that evidence
over to the individual, when he steadfastly maintains his factual inno-

~~' For example, the court in f'airlt:y v. Luman, 281 F.3d 913, 915 (9th Cir. 2002)
(per curiam), considered a situation in which police neither mn a fingerprint com·
parison nor a DMV check in the face of the defendant's protests of innocence. The
court held that his twelve-day detention violated due process, since it would have imposed only a minimum burden on the city to "institut[el readily available procedures
for decreasing the risk of erroneous detention," and the failure to do so constituted
deliberate indifference. ld. at 918; see also Wilson v. Lawrence County, 260 F.3d 946,
957 (8th Cir, 2001) (stating that state officials' failure to follow :an ob'~>ious lead that
resulted in erroneous conviction and nine years of false imprisonment may have been
reckless and, if so, would violate due process); Let: v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668,
685 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that plaintiff had a viable due process claim when the Los
Angeles Police Department failed to compare the fingerprints and physical characteristics of the plaintiff with tho.<~e from New York and ignored the "obvious mental inca·
pacity" of the plaintiff, resulting in two years of false imprisonment); Armstrong v.
SquadriLO, 152 F.3d 564, 568 (7th Cir. 1998) (reversing summary judgment for defen·
darns when, due to the loss of his papetwork, plaiuliff remained in detention for fifty·
seven days despite his daily oral inquiries and written request forms regarding the
status of his case); Gray v. Cuyahoga County Sheriffs Dep't, 150 F.3d 579,583 (6th Cir.
1998) (determining that where the plaintiffs brother had used his name, but the
physical description and photo of the wanted man looked nothing like the plaintiff,
deliberate indifference in failing to ascertain identity would make out a constitutional
violation): Cannon v. Macon County, 1 F.3d 1558, 1563-64 (lllh Cir. 1993) (finding
that where the plaintiff shared a name with the legitimate subject of an arrest warrant,
but did not share the same identifying traits-hair and eye color. age, birthday, or social security number-the arresting officer's deliberate indifference to these facts violated due process).
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cence and asks only that he be allowed to subject that evidence to tests
which, it is conceded, given the evidence introduced at trial in support
2
of conviction, could prove him absolutely innocent of the crime. +1

As we will see, thejustifications given for denial of access in most cases
amount to nothing more than bureaucratic inertia.

IV. THE LIMITED BURDENS OF DNA TESTING
Each of the arguments canvassed above regarding access to courts
and the due process right to exculpatory' evidence could be rebutted if
the burdens imposed on the state by DNA production sufficiently
outweighed the usefulness of access to DNA evidence in avoiding the
risk of imprisoning the innocent. In arguing against the imposition of
a postconviction constitutional duty to permit access to DNA evidence,
courts and prosecutors have asserted the state's interests in finality of
criminal judgments, avoidance of administrative burdens, and federalism. None of these arguments survives scrutiny.
A. :Finality

It cannot be denied that finality is a value in the criminal justice
system. The Supreme Court has regularly proclaimed that finality is
essential to both the retributive and deterrent functions of the criminal law and to the interests of victims of crimes in obtaining closure. 245

144

Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298,319-20 (4th Cii-. 2002} (Luttig,J., concurring}.
Assuming that the courts would recognize a right to po.stconviction DNA testing on the
grounds discus.sed in this Article, it would appear to follow that the prosecutor (or police} would be under a constitutional duty not to deliberately destroy evidence post·
trial. Cf Kyle! v. Whitley, 514 U.S. -tl9, 421·22 (1995) (holding that the p.-osc::cutor is
responsible for any failure to disclose evidence to the defense an.d that, if such a failure
raises the probability that disclosure would have produced a different outcome, the
defendant must have a new trial); Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)
(holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require
the State to preserve semen samples for testing without a showing of bad faith on the
part of the police); United St."ltes v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858. 874 (1982) (finding no violation of respondent's Fifth or Sixth Amendment rights a.s he failed to demon~trate the materiality of evidence unavailable to him at the time of trial).
2
"~ E.g., Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S. 538, 555 ( 1998} (noting that the limits
imposed on the discretion of federal courts to grant habeas relief • reflect our enduring
re~pect for 'the State's interest in the finality of convictions'" (quoting Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619,635 (1993))}; Sawye1· v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333,338 (1992) (reiterating the Court's recognition of the State's interest in finality of convictions); Keeney
v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 7 ( 1992) (stating that finality ofstate criminal convictions
is "a matter of particular importance in a federal system"); McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S.
467, 491 ( 1991} (noting the significance of finality when there is a federul challenge to
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Reliance upon considerations of finality and the limited power of the
courts to grant new trials in cases like Smith and Godschalk, however,
puts the cart of collateral attack before the horse of access to evidence. The threshold issue of whether due process or the right of access to the courts require postconviction access to DNA e~dence does
not entail of its own force any question of judicially ordered release
2411
from custody or the grant of a new trial.
The evidence may inculpate, rather than exonerate; if exculpatory, relief may be provided by
voluntary dismissal of charges or by state clemency proceedings, which
may be granted notwithstanding the finality of the underlying conviction.
The issue of postconviction or habeas relief is distinct from the issue of whether a prisoner may seek access to DNA evidence held by
the prosecutor postconviction simply to test for evidence of innocence. In this context, "finality" has far less weight than in collateral
challenges to convictions. Testing itself has no impact whatsoever on
victims, witnesses, or complainants, unless it actually exonerates an
innocent individual. The request does not implicate any of their interests in repose or privacy since the question of the relevance of the
evidence to the claim of innocence can be decided without reference
to testimony or the submission of any further evidence from victims or
other witnesses. And if the testing demonstrates innocence, neither
the State's nor the victim's interests in retribution, deterrence, or incapacitation are served by continued incarceration.
If an attack on the underlying conviction eventuates, while the
State's interest in finality is at its apogee foiJowing exhaustion of available postconviction and habeas relief, finality has never served as an
absolute bar to constitutional claims, even when they have been pro:~<~7
cedurally defaulted.
In the context of federal habeas proceedings,
while both Congress and the Court have placed great weight on finality in restricting challenges to convictions, the issue of factual innoa state criminal conviction); Murray v. Carrier. 477 U.S. 478, 487 (1986) (acknowledg·
ing the value of finality inherent in state coun criminal convictions).
6
"' See Haroey, 285 F.3d at 321-25 (Luuig,J., concurring) (arguing that the majority
confused a cause of action under§ 1983 with habeas corpus).
247
See Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298,318-20 (1995) (emphasizing that justice often
requires review of successive and abusive habeas claims). The 1996 amendments to
the federal habeas statute, Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA), Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 106, 110 Stat. 1214, 122().21, preclude granting of a
petition except where ( 1) the Supreme Coun has made a new constitutional rule retroactive, or (2) new facts not discoverable by due diligence would show by clear and
convincing evidence that no reasonable jury would find the defendant guilty, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2244(b) (2) (2000).
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cence is of substantial significance in detenhining access to the writ.
In particular, the Court has adopted judge Friendly's view that finality
should not bar review when a prisoner can make a colorable showing
A-J
•
p oweII wrote:
of .mnocence. 2~\1 n:.
ustJce
The prisoner may have a vital interest in having a second chance to test
the fundamental justice of his incarceration. Even where, as here, the
many judges who have reviewed the prisoner's claims in several proceedings provided by the Srnte and on his first petition for federal habeas
corpus have determined that his trial was free from constitutional error,
n prisoner retains a fJOluerful rmd legitimttte interest in obtuining his release frorrt
t:ustody if he is innocent of the charge for which he TllflS incarcerated. That interest does not extend, however, to prisoners whose guilt is conceded or
. 250
pam.
I

In Herrera v. Collins, a plurality of the Court ruled that in the absence of extraordinarily powerful proof of innocence "a claim of 'actual innocence' is not itself a constitutional claim." 2r" But whatever
the merits of this position.2.~~ the Court has assumed that execution of
the demonstrably innocent would be a constitutional violation. It
would be anomalous to find no violation when an innocent person is

24

R See Schl-up, 513 U.S. at 321 (asserting that when a constitutional violation results
in the conviction of one who is actually innocent, a federal habeas court rna)' gram the
writ without showing cause for the procedural default).
~•~ Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 454 8c n.17 (1986) (plurality opinion); see
Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Atttuk on Criminaljudgtnents, 38 U.
CHI. L. REv. 142, 142 (1970) (arguing that "with a few important exceptions, convictions shoutd be subject to cotlateral attack only when the prisoner supplements his
constitutional plea with a colorable claim of innocence"), In Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S.
288 ( 1989), the Court ruled that habeas petitions that would result in the establishment of new constitutional protections were barred unless the new rule placed '"certain kinds of ... conduct beyond the power of the [State]'" or was of the kind that W'dS
"'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'" lrl. at 307 (quoting Mackey v. United
States, 401 U.S. 667,692-93 (1971)).
2 1
!>1 Kuhlrnrmn, 477 U.S. at 452 (emphasis added).
"' 506 U.S. 390, 404 (1993). A showing of actual innocence provides a "'gatc::way'"
to federal habeas review of otherwise defaulted claims. Schlup. 513 U.S. at 315 (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 404); see Burton v. Dormire, 295 F.3d 839, 849 (8th Cir. 2002)
(denying fedt:r<~l habeas petition notwithstanding ~mounting evidence that [the petitioner's] conviction W'dS procured by peljured or tlawed eyewitness testimony" because
the petitioner's claims were without merit).
25
~ See Ht!lrera, 506 U.S. at 426 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting that without a
high threshold of actual innocence, the federal courts would be inundated with frivolous claims); id. aL 437 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments require hearing actual innocence claims).
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sentenced to a substantial period of incarceration. ~~ As the Supreme
Court of South Dakota observed in a comparable context:
The results of DNA testing reconcile two competing goals . . . . The first
goal is to prevent the conviction of an innocent person. The second
goal is the finality of judgments. Admitting DNA evidence meets both
goals. If the evidence exonerates the defendant, then the goal of notallowing an innocent person to stand convicted is served. Ir the evidence
incriminates the defendant, then the goal of finality of judgments is met
254
by adding certainty to the result.

Finally, the usual concerns raised by collateral attacks on convictions
about the reliability of witnesses who come forward years after conviction are lacking in the DNA context.lli"• As contrasted with the potentially elusive, stale, and subjective testimony of witnesses who change
their testimony or who come forward years after a trial, DNA evidence
provides morally certain proof and not simply grounds upon which to
256
question the validity of the conviction.
Moreover, this evidence is
truly "newly discoverable" where DNA testing was unavailable at the

2

~~ See Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 314 (2002) (Luttig,J., concurring) (arguing
that the Court refused to distinguish between the "constitutionally-protected, postconviction interests of the capital and the noncapital prisoner"); see also Herrera, 506
U.S. at 405 ("It would be a rather strange jurispmdence ... which held that under our
Constitution he could not be executed, but that he would spend the rest of his life in
prison.").
2M Davi v. Class, 2000 SD 30, 1 23, 609 N.W.2d 107, 113; see also Inn: Braxton, 258
F.3d 250, 259 (4th Cir. 2001) (refusing to issue mandamus against DNA testing order
because, "' [a}lthough the notion of ¥finality" is important, such finality is not desinble
when the result is the "finality" of the deprivation of liberty at the expense of a constitutional right'" (quoting Cherrix v. Braxton, 131 F. Supp. 2d 756, 784 (E.D. Va.
2000))). In fact, the court-ordered postconviction DNA testing in Davi decisively inculpated the prisoner, a result that obtains in roughly half of postconviction testings.
See Brooke A. Masters, DNA Testing Confirms Mnn's GuiU in Vn. Rape, WASH. POST, May
16, 2002, at Bl (w About half of all conclusive postconviction tests inculpate the inmate,
rather than prove his innocence.").
2.•~ See Akhil Reed Amar, A Safe Intrusion: We Could "fingerprint" Everyone :S DNA and
Still Protect Privacy-If Doctrinal Obstructionists Would just G11t Out of the Way, AM. LAw.,
june 2001, at 69, 69 ("If the DNA casts strong doubt on-or indeed conclusively disproves-the convict's guilt, the state's tnte interests are ill served by suppressing
[DNA] information."); Droelopmmts in the Law-Conftvniing ihe New Challenges of Scientific f..videnCJ~, supra note 133, at 1577-78 (arguing that prosecutors' objections to DNA
testing have little merit and that all problems would bt: solved if a larger DNA database
were created).
256
See Developments in the Law-Confronting the N~r~o Chtt.Uengts of Scierttific Evidmce,
supra note 133, at 1578 ("[AJlthough other relevant. evidence may be elusive or stale
when such [newer forms ot] scientific evidence [are] unearthed, this problem is of less
concern given the remarkably high degree of certainty provided by exculpatory DNA
tests.").
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time of tria1. Thus, there can be no question of the diligence of triaJ
counsel's efforts, "sandbagging" by the defendant, or purposeful delay. In these circumstances, "fundamental fairness" should require·
postconviction relief.

B. Administrative Issues
Prosecutors have argued that aJlowing access to DNA evidence will
divert scarce resources from other tasks and bury prosecutors beneath
a tidal wave of frivolous· requests.\!~ In reality, the administrative burdens of allowing access to DNA evidence are negligible. Prosecutors
and police would have to retain biological evidence (that has not previously been discarded), but this places no significant administrative
burden on the State since the evidence is already in its possession. At
most, the State would be prohibited from destroying the evidence in
the future. To the extent prosecutors or police act under regulations
or standards requiring destruction of evidence, they would be required to exempt biological evidence from this process.
The obligations that flow from the arguments canvassed above
impose no constitutional requirement to test any biological evidence
absent a specific request on behalf of a convicted individual. Indeed,
even on request, an obligation would arise only if the DNA existed
and would, if tested, demonstrate innocence. The number of cases in
which any prosecutor's office would have to search for and eventually
provide the defense access to testing is not likely to be very high.
Prosecutors who have announced the availability of potentially exculpatory DNA evidence on request have not found themselves subject to
any overwhelming burdent~ indeed, even those offices which have
conducted proactive searches for exculpatory DNA have found only a
21
e I o f cases w.h ere testmg
· IS
· appropnate,
·
;o Th
· a d"Istmct
·
...l"
h.an d 1U
. ere 1s
•Jisincentive to the filing of false claims: prisoners who know that the
DNA will confirm their guilt risk prejudicing other legal claims they
may have regarding the fairness of their trial or their access to probation or clemency. Moreover, by seeking DNA testing, guilty prisoners
8

1

::n See id. ("[T)hese kinds of test results were literally undiscoverable at the time of
trial and thus, the diligence of the defendant's investigation cannot be questi9ned.").
2 8
~ See supra notes 49, 52 (discussing state budget limitations and the possibility of

abuse as reasons for preventing access to DNA evidence).
2 9
~ See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text (describing practices in Orange
County, California).
:K".o See supra notes 32, 36, 39 (describing experiences in San Diego, Brooklyn, and
Austin).
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affirmatively place their own DNA profiles in the hands of law enforcement officials who may use that information to connect them to
other crimes. And, as time goes by the universe of cases where blood
or semen samples were not initially tested will diminish.:ro 1
In cases where the defendant has offered to pay the costs, there
will be no financial burden on the State unless the defense's testing
262
provides exonerating evidence. At that point, there will be compelling proof of innocence and the prosecutor will not be able to complain legitimately that testing the evidence in the State's laboratory
would be an unacceptable burden. In cases in which the defendant is
indigent, equal protection and due process principles may well require state-funded testing, but once again the burden will be quite
modest.:lli! And, as technology advances, the costs and administrative
burdens will continue to ease. In light of the extraordinary power of
DNA, a fair balance of interests cannot defeat the right to access.

C. Federalism and Democracy
1. Substance
In Haroey v. Horan, Chiefjudge Wilkinson advanced the claim that
Congress or state legislatures, and not the federal courts, should

:ro• A, DNA technology becomes even more sophisticated, otherwise untestable
samples, including hair :;am pies, may be subject to analysis, thus for a period of time
increasing the potential pool of cases. S« NAT'L COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF DNA
EVIDENCE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE FUTURE OF FORENSIC DNA TESTING:
PREDICTIONS OF THE RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP ::!8 (2000) (noting that better technology will improve testing of DNA samples that are badly damaged
or are currently too small to be analyzed), http:/ /www.ojp.usdoj.gov/nti/pubs-sum/
183697.htm.
202
One prominent laboratory, Orchid Cellmark, has quoted the following prices
for DNA testing: for 13 STR CODIS Core Loci involving Known Samples, $1095 per
sample; for ¥-Chromosome STR Testing, $1275 per sample. Orchid Cellmark Fee
Schedule, available at http://www.cellmark-labs.com/pdf/fee~schedule2002.pdf (july
1, 2002).
ttl' lf the arguments in favor of access are otherwise sufficient to compel a finding
that the due process right is fundamental, the modest costs of testing cannot be
grounds for denial. See supra note 262 {discussing the cost of DNA testing at one laboratory). Due process and equal protection principles provide firm grounds for man·
dated state testing. See, e.g., Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 86-87 (1985) (holding that
th·e State's refusal to provide the defendant with a psychiatrist constituted a denial of
due process); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) (concluding that the State had to
provide "blood grouping" tests to a putative father in paternity actions in accordance
with the due process protection in the Fourteenth Amendment).
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promulgate standards relating to access to DNA evidence.lffiil Specifically, he asserted that the federal courts are ill-suited to address the
questions of which prisoners are entitled to testing; whether a threshold showing would be required (such as contesting identity at trial);
what degree of proof of innocence the DNA evidence would provide;
whether a statute of limitations should be interposed; and who should
pay for the testing, obligations to maintain DNA evidence, and appointment of counsel for indigent prisoners.~!!\ He echoed the position of the National District Attorneys Association that decisions
should be made "at the state or local level, where decisions can reflect
24
the needs, resources and concerns of states and communities." ;r,
These issues are suitable for legislative resolution, and many states
and prosecutors have provided access to DNA. But the freedom of
states to structure their criminal processes is not unbounded, and the
objections to judicial intervention on "deference" grounds are unpersuasive where defendants merely seek access to potentially determinative exculpatory evidence that rests in the exclusive possession of the
State. States may not authorize the use of deadly force on fleeing
117
shoplifters/ detain arrestees indefinitely without arraignment,2c.a or
physically prevent prisoners from challenging their custody in court
after conviction, (~' no matter how much the "concerns of states and
communities" may dictate such policies. So, too, arbitrary denial of
access to DNA evidence that could demonstrate innocence falls outside of the sphere of lpcal autonomy. As we discussed in the previous
Section, resolution of these issues on a constitutional level is not difficult, as the administrative concerns are d!stinctly limited.
Ultimately, the various concerns raised by Chief Judge Wilkinson
and others fail to account for the powerful exonerating quality of
DNA testing. Chiefjudge Wilkinson asserts:
2

It is certainly true and a cause for celebration that DNA testing holds
much promise. And there is no question that accused individuals and
convicted inmates, as well as prosecutors, should reap the benefits of it.
Indeed, many scientific advances promise substantial advantages. But
this does not mean that we are free to constitutionalize a right of access

285 F.3d 298, 304 {4th Cir. 2002) (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring).
u.~ M. at 300·01 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring).
200
NAT'L DIST. ATrOR.'IIEYS Ass'N, supra note 45, at 9.
2 17
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 20.22 (1985) (prohibiting officers' use of
'
2&1
2

deadj' force against nonviolent, fleeing felons).
County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44,58-59 (1991).
!ti'J Ex parte Hull, !112 U.S. 546, 549 (1941); see also suflra note 251 (discussing the
required showing of"actual innocence" for habeas review).
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to the fruits of scientific discoveries. There are often trade-offs to be
faced when science advances. Scientific progress frequently presents
questions of resource allocation, interpretation, application. privacy, and
ethics. Balances must be struck between societal risks and benefits, between alternative ways of understanding and em~loying new techniques,
10
· and between permissible and impermissible uses.
·

Whatever the merit of these. concerns with respect to new sciences, they are largely irrelevant here. There are no difficult "tradeoff" issues-not as to "privacy," "societal risks," "alternative ways of
understanding and employing new techniques," or "ethics," and none
thus far has been· demonstrated as to "resource allocation." To suggest that constitutionalization of postconviction DNA testing poses any
of these concerns is to misunderstand the power and accuracy of this
new science.
2. Procedure
In a strict sense, the issue of the constitutional right to access to
DNA evidence postconviction is purely one of substantive doctrine. If
the right exists, it is enforceable in state or federal court, and, depending on the forum that is chosen to litigate the claim, the issue of fed271
eralism may not even be germane. However, since a primary means
of presenting the federal constitutional issues is by suit under the federal civil rights act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, federalism issues are often implicated. In the context of a federal suit for injunctive relief to compel
70

Harvey, 285 F.3d at 301 (Wilkinson, CJ., concurring).
to note that the due proce!lll and access to the courts argument.s
may also be presented to state courts as a matter of state constitutional law. Over the
past several decades, state courts have developed state constitutional law principles in a
manner that often provides greater protections to lndividual1 by interpreting state
constitutional provisions more broadly than the U.S. Supreme Court has constmed
parallel provisions in the Federal Constitution.
See jENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE
CoNSTITUTIONAL LAW: UTIGATING lNDMDUAL RIGHTS, CLAIMS, AND DEFENSES§ l3(b), at 1-10 (3d ed. 2000) (noting that "even when state and federal clauses are identical, state policy and history may counsel a different interpretation than the fedeml
counterpart"); 1 STEVEN H. STEINGLASS, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS§
1:1 (West Group 2001) ("As the Supreme Court becomes less interested in construing
federal law to protect individual rights and more willing ro restrict access to federal
courts, litigants have turned to state law and state courts as alternative sources of judicial protection." (footnotes omitted)); William J. Brennan, Jr., State Cvnslilution.v artd the
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HA.Rv. L. REv. 489, 495-98 (1977) (recognizing state
constitutional law as offering greater protection of civil liberties than federal constitutional Jaw). For recent cases invoking state constitutional principles to allow postconviction relief in the case of newly discovered evidence, see Grinols v. State, 10 P.3d 600,
617 (Alaska CL App. 2000); Summerville v. Warden, 641 A.2d 1356, 1369 (Conn.
1994); People v. Washington, 665 N.E.2d 1330, 1335-36 (Ill. 1996).
i

t7l
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production or testing of the DNA material, a series of "federalism" olr
jections have been interposed. Chief among these are judicial and
legislative policies requiring submission of certain federal constitutional claims to the state judicial system in the first instance.
The argumer:tts that derive from principles requiring exhaustion
of state remedies rest primarily on the interplay of Heck v. Humphrey,21'l
Preiser v. Rodriguez,~15 and the Court's insistence on providing the state
courts with the initial and primary responsibility for resolving federal
constitutional issues relating to state criminal convictions. In Preiser,
the Court held that when "a state prisoner is challenging the very fact
or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a
determination that he is entitled to immediate release or a speedier
release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of
habeas corpus. "274 The Court was particularly concerned that § 1983
not be used to circumvent the exhaustion requirement of federal habeas corpus, as § 1983 suits can come immediately to federal court
275
without any need to exhaust state remedies.
Accordingly, a § 1983
suit could not be brought to mandate release from custody based on
an underlying constitutional violation in the state criminal proceed•
mgs.
While a few courts have found Preiser to bar a § 1983 suit for disclosure or testing of DNA evidence,m we do not believe that Preiser
mandates dismissal. The claimant is not by such an action presently
~76

:rn 512
:m 411
27

u.s. 477 (1994).

u.s. 475 (1973).

/d. at 500.
2
m /d. at 489.
•

¥Ill Requiring st.·ue prisoners to invoke federal habeas corpus to challenge the fact
or duration of confinement pursuant to a state conviction mandates adherence not
only to exhaustion of state: rc:medies, but to a myriad of othe.r procedur.d require·
ments, including a statute of limitations, proper presentation of the issue to the state
courts, and strict limits on successive petitions. Sei! supra note 23 (noting the proceduml barriers). Further, under AEDPA, the federal habeas court must give deference
to the state court's resolution of the federal con:;titutional issue, and relief may be
gr.mted only when the state court decision is M'contrary to. clearly established Fed·
era! law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,· or ... 'involve(s]
an unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law.'" Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,412 (2000) (O'Connor,]., concurring) (omissions in original) (quot·
ing 28 U.S.C. § 22b4(d)(l) (2000)).
m E.g., Boyle v. Mayer, No. 02-3124, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 19654, at *3 (6th Cir.
Sept. 17, 2002); Kutzner v. Montgomery County, 303 F.3d 339, 341 (5th Cir. 2002) (per
curiam). The Eleventh Circuit has rejected this argument. Sei! Bmdley v. Pryor, 305
f.3d 1287, 1290 (11th Cir. 2002) (allowing prisoner's § 1983 suit seeking to compel
production of DNA evidence to proceed because Msuccess in his suit will not demonstrate the invalidity of his conviction or sentence").

2002]

DOUBLE HEUX, DOUBLE BIND

615

challenging the fact or duration of her confinement. She challenges
only the decision by state administrators to bar access to potentially
determinative evidence, and success in the civil rights action achieves
access to evidence, nothing more. Depending upon the results of testing, state or federal postconviction remedies of release or a new trial
may be available, but those questions will be part of an entirely separate proceeding. And even ifjudicial relief is barred, the results of the
tests may aid in appeals for clemency.
In Heck v. Humphrey, the Court ruled that§ 1983 suits brought by
persons convicted of criminal offenses were barred if the relief requested would "necessarily imply the invalidity of [the plaintiff's] con27
viction or sentence. " " This doctrine was intended to prevent prisoners from avoiding the exhaustion requirements of federal habeas
corpus by requiring them to challenge their convictions by state appeals or collateral review before seeking federal court intervention.
However, Heck applies only when the ruling in a civil rights action
would have the effect of "necessarily imply[ing]" that the conviction
was unconstitutionai. 27'J An order for DNA testing has no direct, much
0
less necessary, impact on a conviction.~ The results may be inculpatory (thereby supporting the conviction), exculpatory, or inconclusive.
But if exculpatory, there is still no judgment by a court undermining
the conviction.
To be sure, the evidence could then be used to seek collateral relief, but that is true with respect to any newly discovered evidence that
is of sufficient weight to provide grounds for a constitutional chal-

m 512 U.S. at487.
ttl.

t'T'J

2

., Su Harvey v. Horan, 285 F.3d 298, 308 (4t.'l Cir. 2002) {luttig,J., concuning}
("I do not believe it even arguable that a post-conviction action merely to permit access
to evidence for the purpose of STR DNA testing 'necessarily implies' invalidity of the
underlying conviction."); see also Harvey v. Horan, 278 F.3d 370, 383 (4th Cir. 2002)
(King, j .• concurring) ("The issue ... is simply whether the claim made by Harvey
would 'necessarily imply' that his conviction should be reversed. In this situation. that
is plainly not the case ...."). To be sure, Chief judge Wilkinson not only argued, but
won the point by a two-to-one vote in Haroey, 285 F.3d at 298; see also IJ()]ll!, 2002 U.S.
App. LEX IS 19654, at •3 (r~jecting prisoner's § 1983 claim seeking access to DNA evidence for testing because it "challenged the validity of his criminal convictions and the
fact or duration of his continued confinement~); Kutr.nn; 303 F.3d at 341 ("[A] pris.
oner's request for DNA testing of evidence relevant to his prior conviction is 'so intertwined' with the merits of the conviction as to require habeas corpus treatment."
(quoting Ma1tinez v. Tex. Court of Criminal Appeals; 292 F.3d 417, 423 (5th Cir.
2002)) ). But as the Eleventh Circuit recently observed: "[l]f [the plaintifl] is successful in his lawsuit, his conviction and sentence will not be called into question, since the
only thing he will have secu_red is access to evidence." Bradley, 305 F.3d at 1292.
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lenge to the conviction. The claim of a constitutional right to DNA
postconviction testing is entirely separate from and antecedent to a
challenge to the conviction. Any question concerning whether the
DNA evidence is sufficiently exonerating to merit a postconviction
hearing will be presented in the context of the later postconviction
petition. At that time, a court can decide, based on an analysis of the
DNA results and the prosecution's theory of guilt, whether a new trial
or dismissal is warranted. If the DNA evidence does not exonerate, no
further proceedings will be necessary. Thus, in the typical case, the
only state interest asserted is that the mere disclosure of already secured evidence upsets an interest in finality. In the words of Judge
Luttig, the asserted interest in assuring state authority over finality is
"non-existent"~

81

CONCLUSION

Not every good idea or morally correct position is enforceable as a
matter of constitutional law. In this Article. we have set out to determine whether the moral intuition that a State may not withhold previously untested DNA evidence that could fully exonerate one convicted
of a crime can be established as a constitutional claim. Our investigation has disclosed that settled due process principles regarding access
to exculpatory evidence and access to the courts provide a firm doctrinal foundation for these claims.
DNA evidence is unique in its potential exonerating force in the
most serious of criminal cases. The right of access to the courts cannot be defeated by the decision of prosecutors not to risk their verdicts by disclosing potentially exculpatory evidence. Due process jurisprudence, as reflected in four decades of litigation following Brady
,/ 2R2 man dates ~~ur
C. •
•
. •
v.•.\I
uaryla nu.
proced ures to protect agamst
conV!ctwn
Harvey, 285 F.3d at 320 (Luttig,J., concurring). In the context offed~ral ha·
applications, courts have ordt:red postconviction DNA tests in order to establish
predicates for other constitutional violations. Sa, e.g., Toney v, Gammon, 79 F.3d 693,
700 (8th Cir. 1996) (rejecting lower court's determination Lhat permiLting postconviction DNA tests ~·would open the flood gates for DNA testing ... in every rape case
where the individual is still serving time'" and finding that "[i]n order to prove the
prejudice prong of his ineffective assistance claim, [petitioner] is entitled to have access to this evidence [for DNA testing]" (omis.~ion in original)); Thomas v. Goldsmith,
979 F.2d 746, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1992) (concluding that, in light of the obvious exculpatory potential of semen evidence in a sexual assault case, the State had to turn over
such evidence in order for the petitioner to attempt to overcome his procedurally
barred habeas claims).
2
~" 373 U.S. 83 (1963); .see sufnn note 82 (outliningjurisprudence after Brady).
2lll
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and incarceration of the innocent. Prosecutors have a special duty to
ensure against wrongful convictions, and applying the Brady rule283 in
the postconviction context, when a claim of innocence is made on the
basis of existing DNA evidence, strongly advances the private interest
in liberty while imposing no discernible impact on any legitimate governmental interest. With over 100 persons exonerated of serious
criminal convictions, including capital offenses, finality does not demand-and the Constitution does not tolerate-willful refusal to allow access to potentially exculpatory DNA evidence.

m &e supra text accompanying notes 113-17 (discussing the B·rady mle).

